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THE QUEST TO REPROGRAM CUL TURA I, SOFTWARE: A 
HERMENEUTICAL RESPONSE TO JACK BALKIN'S THEORY 
OF IDEOLOGY AND CRITIQUE 
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ Ill* 
I NTRODUCTION 
Critical theory has lost the self-assurance that defined the heady 
days of Marxist economics and Freudian psychoanalysis. In his 
famous debate with Hans-Georg Gadamer thirty years ago, Jurgen 
Habermas t~rgued that critical theory was a necessary corrective to 
the quiescence and conventionalism that followed from Gadamcr's 
hermeneutic perspective. As the 1960s unfolded, the second 
generation of the Frankfurt School appeared poised to bring 
sophisticated techniques of social criticism to bear on the emerging 
postindustrialist system of global capitalism. But the promise of 
critical theory failed to materialize. Today, Habermas plays the role 
of the aging lion wbo refuses to accept the postmodern verdict that 
his theoretical roar simply has no practica l bite. Sophistict~ted 
philosophy is just another narrative. the postmodernists argue, and 
the dream of cri tical theory is just a fantasy. Locked in the grip of this 
impasse, theorists are now searching for a new approach to critical 
theory. 
Against this backdrop, Jack Balkin has written an important 
book that attempts to define critical theory in our postmodern age. 
Balkin's previous Legal scholarship invoked postmodern and 
deconstructive themes, but it also invoked the critical legal stud ies 
tradition in A merica, which has adopted (loosely) the goals and 
methods of the Frankfut1 School in the context of legal theory.' In 
* Profcc;sor of Law. Penn Stat~ Universi ty. Dickinson School of Law. This Art ide grew 
out of my in troductory comments as chair o f a panel at the Second Annual Meeting <>f the 
Working Group on Law. Culture. a~~J the Hucna nities. Wake Forest University School o f Law. 
March 12- 14, 1999. I would like to thank Georg.: Taylor for prcsen1ing a very interec;ting and 
chaUenging critique! of Balkin's book. th., audience for thdr probing comments and que~tions. 
aod Jack Balkin for h1s spirited particip<•t ion . I bendited !rom comment< on an earlier dra ft 
that were offered gl!nerou;ly by Step Feldman, Jim G:1rdner. and George Taylqr. 
1. See, e.g .. J.M. Balkin. Deconsrrucrivo> Practic~ and Legal Theury. 96 YALE LJ. 743 
(1987) (using Derrida 's deconstruction to furth"r the goals of ~riticallcgal theory). 
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Cultural Software: A Theory of Jdeology.2 Balkjn moves beyond the 
specific realm of legal philosophy and presents a comprehensive 
theory about the nature and genesis of ideology and the role of 
critical theory in responding to the effects of ideology. Balkin argues 
that using the metaphor of "cultural software" to describe the "tools" 
of understanding and evaluation opens a pathway for moving beyond 
entrenched positions and delivering a new and more productive 
account of ideology and the prospects for critical theory. In short, 
Balkin proposes to demonstrate that critical theory remains possible 
in a postmodern world. 
Although Balkin displays an impressive grasp of numerous 
currents in contemporary thought, I will argue that the guiding 
metaphor of "cultural software'' proves unhelpful in gathering these 
currents into a better conception of critical theory. Balkin uses 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as his foil at critical junctures 
of his account. but his impoverished reading of Gadamer's philosophy 
leads him to underestimate the force of Gadamer's hermeneutical 
challenge to critical theory. My thesis is that the productive aspects of 
Balkin's theory in fact are central to Gadamcr's philosophical 
hermeneutics, and that the unproductive elements in Balkin's theory 
are best explained by his deviation from Gadamer's hermeneutical 
approach. Bal.kin's theory of ideology and critique delivers some 
important insigh ts, but it must be recast in terms of the hermeneutical 
tradition that he unsuccessfulJy attempts to surpass. 
It would be ironic if I claimed to judge Balkin from a fixed and 
insular conception of philosophical hermeneutics, given the centrality 
of dialogue to Gadamer's philosophy of human understanding. I 
concede at the outset that the role of critical theory has too often 
been suppressed in philosophical hermeneutics, leading to the kinds 
of misunderstandings that appear in Balkin's book. In the foreword 
to the second edition of Truth and Method, Gadamer acknowledged 
that his focus on hermeneutic universalism displayed a certain "one-
sidedness" that had tended to obscure that '' it is still part of the 
nature of man to be able to break with tradition, to criticize and 
dissolve it," but Gadarner insisted that his one-sidedness embodied 
the "truth of a corrective" .in response to the intellectual hubris of the 
modern atgc of instrumental reason.3 The intellectual tide has clearly 
2. J.M. BALKJN,CULTURAL SOfTWAR C: A THEORY OF'l0£0LOGY (1998). 
3. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRtmi AND METHOO. at xxxvii (Joel Wt:insheimer & 
Donald G . Marshall trans .. Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (L960) 
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reversed in the intervening years, however. Postmodernism reflects 
the most radical elements of a more broad-based rejection of the 
naive scientific consciousness that was Gadamer's original ta rget. As 
a result, now it is necessary to draw from Gadamcr's hermeneutical 
philosophy a different ''corrective" that can overcome the neglect of 
man's critical "nature" that currently reigns. ln the course of 
identifying the inadequacies of Balkin's account, then, philosophical 
hermeneutics will emerge with new accents and themes. Balkin ·s 
provocation helps to reveal that the positive contribution that 
philosophical hermeneutics makes to the critique of ideology is 
lodged precisely with:in its longstanding arguments against 
ove rreaching by critical theorists such as Habermas. 
In Part I. T unpack Balkin 's metaphor of "cultural software" and 
argue that he shares substantial common ground with Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics, notwithstanding his insistence on 
drawing a sharp distinction. However, I contend that Gadamer 
employs more fru itful metaphors in expressing their common 
approach to human understanding. In Part II, I describe Balkin's 
theory of ideology and his corresponding account of critical theory. 
Balkin correctly moves beyond "pejorative" accounts of ideology that 
first presume unproblematic grounds for determining the contours of 
justice and rationality and then equate ideology with defective modes 
of knowledge that yield irrational and unjust social practices. 
However. Balkin's use of a transcendental argument to secure critical 
theory betrays his model of human understanding. Tn Part HI, I 
defend the critique of ideology while avoiding the problems that 
Balkin encounters by returning to Gadamer's hermeneutical 
philosophy through the work of Calvi.n Schrag and P. Christopher 
Smith. Critical theory survives "postmodemity" and the "interpretive 
turn" without transcendental arguments, I argue, and reconceived in 
this new light. philosophical hermeneutics effectively points the way 
to developing a postmodern account of critical legal theory. 
I. CULTURAL SOFTWARE AND H UMAN UNO ERST ANDING 
A Balkin 's Metaphor of Cultural Software: Evolution through 
Interaction 
Balkin uses the tem1 cultural software as a ·'master metaphor'·~ 
for describing our c.apacity to understand and evaluate our world. His 
4. BALKIN. Sllpltl note 2, nt 286. 
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metaphor is rather complex and requires careful delineation. First, 
Balkin emphasizes that cultural software is not like a program that we 
might choose to "run" in order to accomplish a specific task. Instead, 
cultural software is an operating system of cognitive tools and skills 
that permit us to apprehend, understand, and evaluate the world. We 
don't use cultural software; rather, in a very important sense we are 
cultural software. From this it folJows that cultural software is not a 
limited information-processing capacity; it consists (at a minimum) of 
"the abilities, associations, heuristics, metaphors, narratives, and 
capacities that we employ in understanding and evaluating the social 
world."5 Despite the breadth of this definition, cultural software is 
bounded. Balkin stresses that because we are finite, historical beings 
we embody a set of cognitive tools that ''simultaneously enable and 
limit our understanding, empower us and have power over us. "6 
Because we literaJly cannot apprehend the world by putting aside our 
cultural software, this opening to the world proves to be a restrictive 
filter as well. By using a metaphor to understand the world we 
necessarily eschew different metaphors that would yield different 
understandings. 
The second important feature of cultural software is that it is 
"written and rewritten through social interaction and commu-
nication. "7 Our cultural software continually undergoes revision as a 
result of our interaction with other people, each of whom bears 
slightly different copies of cultural software.8 Balkin insists that 
cultural software is "in" each individual and is not a "supraindividual'' 
entity, but he maintains that cultural software is constantly affected 
by an "economy of exchange" among interacting individuals.9 
Cultural software is not the possession of an insulated self because, as 
a product of exchange and interaction, it is constantly and 
unavoidably altered in ways that are beyond the individual's 
conscious control or direction. 10 
Third, Balkin defines cultural software by reference to its 
constituent elements. Balkin borrows the concept of a "meme" from 
the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins to characterize linguistic 
and bodily skills-including "skills, norms, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, 
5. ltl. at 6. 
6. kl. at 3. 
7. ld. a t 14. 
K ld. a t 14·16. 
9. /d. at 95; see itL at 92-96. 
10. /d. at 23-41 (chapter 2, entitled ··Bricolage and the Construction of Cultural Software··). 
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values, and other forms of information'' 11 -that comprise the building 
blocks of cultural software. Balkin defines memes as ''the smallest 
units of cultural skills or information 'that can [sic) replicate 
themselves with reliability and fecundity. "'12 Cultural software 
evolves because it is exposed to an economy of exchange in which 
memes are appropriated, modified, and propagated. Balkin's analysis 
is best illustrated by considering the well-known legal norm of 
"equality under the law." Balkin would contend that this norm is a 
particularly durable meme because it is constantly invoked in a 
variety of settings, with the result that it has an ever-changing valence. 
This meme is an important part of an American lawyer's cultural 
software because it acts as an ordering principle and filter for diffuse 
experience; in effect it is a means of limiting the perception of reality. 
This meme is also expansive and dynamic, though, because it is 
invoked in new situations and it continually evolves as a result of an 
economy of exchange between individuals who will have (usually only 
slightly) different practices for employing this meme. Moreover, the 
use of this meme is propagated through the group affiliations and 
disciplinary practices of lawyers, and so it is socially defined and 
maintained beyond immediate exchanges between two people. 
Finally, the meme is employed in ordinary discourse in a variety of 
nonlegal settings, expanding beyond a restricted scope of operation in 
a manner that Balkin explains by borrowing the concept of bricolage 
from Claude Levi-Strauss. 13 
Fourth, Balkin argues that memes compete for survival and are 
not simply inert bits of information that people choose to employ. 
Memes have varying degrees of hardiness, which can be assessed by 
the ability of the meme to survive in the economy of exchange while 
retaining a similar structure over time. 14 In every culture, "at any 
point in time there is a 'meme pool' of memes competing for survival 
in the environment of human minds, just as there is a gene pool that 
competes in its environment. '' 15 Memes are symbionts in this 
environment: "they survive, reproduce, and propagate because it 
11. ld. at 43. 
12. /d. at47 (quoting DANIEL C. DENNETT. CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 201 (!991)). 
13. Stfe icl. at 23-41. Bricoluge refers to the use of tools <It hand in a n~w contt~xt ()r in 
response to ne w problems. Just as we might use a screwdriver to pound a nai l in <1 pinch. we 
often use memes in a ne w context beyond their original use. ther~by ex:p<Jnding the ~cope of the 
meme. Balkin argues tha t "Cultural bricolage (I) is cumulativ~, (2). involv~s unintend~d uses. 
(3) is economical or recursive. and (4) h<~s unintended comequences." /d. <tl 32. 
14. See id. at 57. 
15. fd. at 41!-49. 
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advantages tbem,''to and they can spread in a manner very similar to a 
computer virus tha t infects the software programs with which it comes 
into contact if the memes are sufficiencly "catching. " 17 Memes are 
more or less successful in surviving and spreading throughout culture 
fo r a variety of substanti ve and psychological factors that enhance 
their utility.ts In this respect. Balkin adopts a structuralist approach 
to explai n the ability of some memes to cohere with the dominant 
shared features of cultura l software and to remain accessible for 
continued use. subject to the cognitive capacities and social needs of 
their human hosts. t ~ 
Finally, cultural software is defined as the mechanisms (or 
'·tools") by which memes are transmitted and utilized by social actors. 
Balkin provides an extensive and illuminating discussion of a variety 
of mechanisms- cultural heuristics, narrative expectations, 
homologies and associations. and metaphors and other cognitive 
models- but ms primary a im is to demonstrate the ambivalent 
character of all tool of human understanding. Balkin ambitiously 
attempts to merge the interpretive turn with the cognitive revolution20 
for the purpose of demonstrating that the mechanisms by which we 
have a world necessarily limit the scope of our understanding of the 
world. Understanding is purchased a t the cost of filte ring the diffuse 
experience of reality through cognitive mechanisms such as metaphor 
and metonymy. Although a ll mechanisms of understanding can yie ld 
both good effects and bad effects, the mechanisms themselves are 
neither "good" nor "bad.'' For example. metaphoric understanding 
produces good results in some senings by enabling us to order ou r 
world, but metaphoric understanding also produces bad effects in 
other settings by limiting or foreclosing certain ways of ordering our 
world.21 Our mechanisms of understanding, as tools, are ambivalent. 
16. ld.a t 61;set!nl~oid nt 61·68. 
17. /d. at 6().()1. 
18. See id. at 75 88. 
19. Balk.m explains that rhe substantive factors that determine the succes:. of a rncmc 
extend beyond the .. truth or falsiry•· of the informational content and inclull.: th£> effects 
generated by the meme such as strong em;tions. "ntertainmenl. or support for o ngoing 
activities. Jd. at 75-76. Psychological factors include the ease of comprehen~10n. re ten tion, 
retrieval, and communication. /d. at 76-&2. Once again. these factors extend b<:)Ond the 
question of the truth o r falsiry of the m"me. and Balkin emphasizes that some memes are 
dura bit! preci~ely because they provide par.>.digm> of wrong or unsucce<5sful norms or behaviors. 
/d. alll2. 
20. ld. at Hln-1!7. 
21. Balkin wrilcs: .. Metaphorical models are claSSIC examples oi the ambiv~lent nature of 
cultuJal soflw~r~. They assist underslanding in some respects even as they hinder il in otherS. 
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Just as a hammer may be used to build shelter from the environment 
or to altack another person, the metaphors we live by can foster just 
social conditions or unjust social conditions. 
Balkin argues for the superiority of his metaphor of cultural 
software by contrasting his views with Gadamer's hermeneutical 
approach to human understanding. Balkin acknowledges that his 
approach has hermeneutical fea tures, but he insists that the metaphor 
of cultural software overcomes serious inadequacies in Gadamer's 
philosophy. In particular, he argues that Gadamer's concept of the 
"tradition'' that shapes human understanding is misguided because it 
posits tradition as "supraindividual entity" 22 that guides under-
standing, leaving Gadamer un able " to explain how shared cultural 
understandings can be shared while still accounting for the 
considerable differentiation ond disagreement in belief among 
members of the same culture or interpretive community.''l~ Tn other 
words, Balkin asks of G adamer: Jf trad ition secures shared beliefs, 
how docs disagreement arise? And if tradition dot:s not perfectly 
secure shared beliefs , then how does it come to be instantiated in 
each individual in varying degrees? Balkin contends that he avoids 
this conundrum by focusing on the cultural software that is "in" each 
individual. while also acknowledging that cultural software is 
continually modified through an economy of exchange drawing upon 
a (generally) common meme pool. 
8. Gadamer's Mecaphor of Conversation and the Si;vuficance of 
Tradition 
Contrary to Balkin's claim, Gadamer's philosophical herme-
neutics describes human understanding in a ma nner that is very 
similar to Balkin's account. Tt is important to reveal this common 
starting point, because Gadamer·s approach to the critique of 
ideology overcomes the deficiencies in Balkin's account of critical 
theory by remaining faithful to the general model of human 
understanding that he shares with Balkin. Balkin errs by concluding 
that in order '"[t]o describe the phenomenon of ideology, we need 
something like G adamer 's concept of tradition, but we must alter it 
considerably to avoid the puzzles that this and similar concepts 
·n,~.ir power stems precisely from thl!ir ability to empower un<.lt! r ~lan\ling hy shaping and hence 
limillng it." ld. at 248. ' 
22. Jd. at 10. 
23. !d. Ill 7. 
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produce."24 The concept of tradition plays an important role in 
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy, but Gadamer never regards 
tradition as a "supraindividual entity" that imparts understanding to 
individuals. In fact, Gadamer's concept of tradition is only one part 
of a sophisticated and subtle account of human understanding that is 
quite similar to BaLkin's account, but which opens greater possibilities 
for describing the contours of a postmodern critical theory. 
Balkin interprets Gadamer's reference to tradition out of 
context, disregarding Gadamer's use of a number of interrelated 
concepts to describe human understanding. Gadamer's central claim 
is that human understanding is interpretive. He is not concerned with 
developing pragmatic strategies for interpreting specific texts or social 
acts; rather, Gadamer makes an ontological claim that the 
hermeneutical situation of interpreting is universal and unavoidable. 
Reflecting on the theme of Truth and Method, he writes: "My real 
concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to 
do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing."25 
Gadamer expresses his thesis by joining several key concepts in a 
nuanced phenomenological account. He begins by stating that 
individuals embody a "forestructure of meaning" (read: cultural 
software; me.chanisrns of understanding) that is expressed in the form 
of "prejudices" or "precommitments" (read: memes), and then argues 
that understanding results from a decentering "fusion of horizons" 
(read: evolution of memes in a new context) in which two individuals 
have a "genuine experience" (read: economy of exchange) that 
disrupts the pretense that either individual is an insulated self.26 
Gadamer emphasizes the mutuality that defines exchanges 
leading to understanding by proposing his own metaphor in the form 
of a synecdoche: he suggests that the experience of understanding is 
revealed by reflecting on the experience of corning to an agreement in 
conversation. Beginning with the insight that "the more genuine a 
24. !d. at 13. 
25. GADAMER,supra note 3. al xxviii. 
21i . I have discussed these features of Gadamcr's philosophy in some detail in previous 
articles. See Francis J. Mootz III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics. Legal 
Argwnemation, and the Natural Law Tradition , 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (L999) (hereinafte r 
Mootz, Law in Flax]: Ftancis J. Mootz Ill, Rhetorical Knowledgl' in Legal Practice mu/ Theory. 6 
S. CAL. lNTERD!SC. LJ. 491 (1998) (hereinafter Mootz. Rhetoticul Knowledge]; Francis J . 
Mootz Ill. Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demomtration That the Obvious Is Platuihle. 6L 
TENN. L. REv 69 (1993) [hereinafter Mootz, Rule of Law]; Francis J. Moolz III. The 
Omological Basi.< of !.ega/ Hermeneu1ics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry B11sed on the Work of 
Gada.mer, Hahermas (j/ld Ricoeur, 68 B.U. l. REV. 523 (1988) (hereinafter Mootz. Onwlogical 
Basis I. 
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conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either 
partner," Gadamer characterizes the understanding that occurs in 
conversation as "an event that happens to us. "'27 The metaphor of 
conversation underscores the ego-decentering thmst of Gadamer's 
philosophy, not just by recalling the experience of recognizing the 
superior insight of one's conversational partner, but also by recal.ling 
the conversational play that occurs beyond the conscious direction of 
either person.u 
The dialogical character of language ... leaves behind it any 
starting point in the subjectivity of the subject, and especially in the 
meaning-directed intentions of the speaker. What we find 
happening in speaking is not a mere reification of intended 
meaning, bur an endeavor that continually modifies itself, or better: 
a continually recurring temptation to engage oneself in something 
or to become involved with someone. But that means to expose 
oneself and 10 risk onesel f.19 
Gadamer persuasively reinforces Balkin's description of an economy 
of exchange that affects each individual's cultural software by 
pointing to the common experience of a conversation, in which 
something is expressed that moves beyond the two individuals and 
represents a shared creation beyond either's instrumental control. 
Gadamer's references to "tradition '' can be understood only in 
light of the conceptual backdrop that Gadamer summarizes with the 
metaphor of conversation. Gadamer emphasizes the power of 
tradition only to emphasize that an individual interpreter can never 
rise above her historical and finite "hermeneutical situation." In this 
sense, tradition is nothing more than an ongoing conversation in 
which we always already find ourselves, a conversation that bears 
historical weight because, as it spirals forward through time, it 
establishes the meme pool through which an individual gains an 
understanding of the world. Tradition is "outside" individual selves 
only to the extent that memes are continually regenerated in playful, 
conversational exchanges that take place over time and throughout 
the culture, and so it constitutes the horizon within which an 
individual can understand at all. It is clear, though, that tradition 
27. GADAMER, supra note :'1. at 383. 
2~. Gadamcr's phenomenological de~cription of the experience of ·'play" forms the core of 
Tmth und Me1ltnd. and he uses the metaphor of conversatio n to emphasize the Jinguisticality of 
human undersrandmg. For a review of Gadamer's concepl of ··play," see \1ootz. Omoiogical 
Basi~. sttpra note 26, at 53 L·33. , 
29. Hans-Gr::org Gadamer. Text and Jmerpr~tarion (Dennis J. Schmidt & Richard E. 
Palmer trans.). in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTEil 
21.26 (Diane P. Mjchclfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds .• 19R9). 
CNICAGO·Kl:.NT l-AW t<J:;VJt::W IVol. 76:945 
exists only ''in" dynamic exchanges between individuals. As 
Gadamer relates, Hcidegger's ontological treatment of the herme-
neutical circle emphasizes this dynamic character of tradition: 
·'Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition jthar is later used 
by a subject in interpretation]: rather, we produce it ourselves 
inasmuch HS we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition. 
and hence further determine it ourselves."·~' Tradition is cognitjvely 
empowering, rather than a re crvoir of information from which a 
subject can freely choose. 
Although Gadmner emphasizes thar tradition serves as a 
cha llenge to. and provocation of, individual interpretive strategies, he 
is quite clear that tradition does not confront individuals as a force 
from outside their existence. Gadamer writes that 
Our usual relationship to the past is not characterized by distancing 
and freeing ourselves from tradition [as if it were an external 
entity]. Rather. we are always situated within traditions, and this is 
no objectifying process-i.e .. we do not conceive of what tradition 
says as something other, something alien. It is a lways part of us, a 
model o r exempla r, a kind of cognizance that our later historical 
judgment would hardly regard as a kind of knowledge but as the-
most ingenuous affiuity with tradition.3L 
Gadamer's tradition is much like Balkin 's cultural software: it is our 
continually modified opening to the world- a historical, social. and 
finite set of cognitive mechanisms and memes- that precludes "pure" 
knowledge.-'2 Tradition is ambivalent: il is neither the "shacklc.::s of the 
past," nor a utopian "golden age," but instead it is the dynamic 
situation in which we find ourselves as historical, finite beings who 
cannot look at the world with entirely "fresh" eyesY "Understanding 
30. GA l>A \1ER .. mpr,, nolc 3. at 29.~. 
31. !d. at 2!\2. 
32. Gadumer ~tarldy dtsl inguishcs tr<~d ilion from a natural law conception of "the eternal 
orders of nature." and he emphasizes that " the way we experience one ~nothcr. the way we 
e-xperience historica.l tradition<, the wa~ w.: experience the natural givenne-;s of our c~istence 
at1d of our worh.l. constilutt: a truly h~rmeneutic universe. in which we are not imprisoned. as if 
behind insurmountable barri.:rs, hut to which we art: opened.·· ld. at xxiv. 
33. Gadamcr's translators make th is pnint in their preface to Truth anti Methud in the 
course of explaining iho? di[ficulty they faced in rem.k ring Gadamcr's use uf' "traditiun·· in 
English: 
This on~,tomg conver~ation i~ OhaltltffrU11f.'., "tradition:· English has no corresponding 
verb. nor any adjccnve that maintain~ the active verbnl tmplication, nor any noun for 
what is cnrrietl down in "tradition." We have therefore admitted the ncolog~<m 
"traditionary text.'' and have sometime~ used tbc phmsc "what come~ down to u~ rrom 
the past" or ''handed oown from the past" lo coovcy the active sense of the German. 
We arc likely to think of "tradition" a~ "'hal lies merely behind u.' or as wbat we ta k.e 
over mor~ or less automatically. On the.> contrary. for Gadamcr "tradition·· or "what is 
handed down from the past" con(ronl~ us as a tt1.<k, as nn effort Clf undcrs1anding w~ 
feel ourselves reqUired ll' make !><:cause we recognize our limitations. ewn though no 
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is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an 
event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present 
arc constantly mediated. ".'4 
Gadamer's concept of tradition not only is consistent with the 
model of human understanding that he shares with Balkin, it serves as 
a better vehicle for expressing this model. Balkin draws heavily on 
contemporary debates in evolutionary biology to argue that memes 
compete for survival in the cultura] software of human hosts, and that 
this competition can be viewed productively through the lens of 
contemporary cognitive science. Although cultural soflware is "in" 
individuals, he contends that memes can be isolated for study just as 
scientists can isolate human genes for study apart from individual 
persons. George Taylor persuasively demonstrates that Balkin 
retreats from his model of human understanding by taking this tack, 
moving away from bricolage that occurs in a historically contingent 
economy of exchange and embracing a more functionalist account of 
the survival of memes.3~ 
D avid Charny criticizes Balkin on similar grounds, pointing out 
that Balkin's use of the concept of a mcme is particularly curious in 
light of the original purpose of the concept. Charny notes that the 
mc.me was developed by biologists, cognitive psychologists, and 
philosophers who sought to descr1be the processes of thought with 
conceptions that were entirely physiological and material-or. at 
least, observable by the procedures of empirical science- and so 
would not depend on supposedly occult metaphysical conceptions 
such a~ an individual "consciousness. "3• 
one compels us to do so. Jt precludes complacencj. passivity. and self-satisfact1on with 
what we s~curely possess; instead it requires active qucstiomng and self-questioning. 
Joel Weinshiemer & Donald G. Mar~hall. Translators' Pn'fuc:l! to GADAMER, s .. pra note 3, a t xi, 
X\' I. 
34. G.\O~MER. supra note: 3. at 290. Gadamer makes the point !:hat it is the historicity of 
unde~tanding that parado~ically enable:; understanding to rise above solipsi~m and 
subjectivism. 
Th.is means. above all, that it is not correct to as~erl tba l the studv of a tex t or a 
tradit ion is completely dep~ndcnt upon our own decision making. Such a frccclom. 
such a standing at a distance from the examined object $imply does not exist. We all 
stand in the life-stream of tradition and do not have the sovereign distance that the 
na tural sciences [methodologically] maintain in order to conduct experiments and to 
construct theori~s . 
. . . We are not ollserwrs who look at history from a distance; rather. in;ofar as we 
arc historical cr~atur~. we are alway~ oo the in~itle of Lhc history tha t we arc striving 
to comprehend. 
H ANS-GEORG GADAMER. l){E BE(,t:-.'Nll'G Of PHtLCJ~CJPHY '2,8 (Rod Collman trans .. 
Continuum Publ'g 1998) (l996). 
35. Su George Taylor. Jusri ce J\s Postmodern? 12-13. 26 (unpublished paper. on file with 
the Chicago Kent Law Review) (reviewing BALKJ~, supra nNe 2). 
36. David C harny. Fart::wel/ 10 an Idea? Ideology in Legal Theory. 97 MtCH. L. 'REV. 1.'\96. 
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Balkin readily concedes that memes are not distinct entities that are 
transmitted throughout culture in the same way that a gene is 
transferred to offspring/ 7 and so his meme tic analysis ine vitably 
generates tension within his model of human understanding. 
Consequently, Charny suggests that Gadamer1S concept of "tradition" 
is more suitable than Balkin's mcmetic analysis for exploring the 
model of human understanding that Balkin outlines. 
The merely beh<lvioral notion of transmittability is inadequate to 
the task [of explaining the evolution of cultural software] because it 
does not tell us how to decide what counts as proper transmission 
or a meme, as opposed to invention of a new one. Rather, what 
makes the fragment accessible cognitively is its embedding in a 
larger structure of perception or analysis-the sort of structure with 
which Gadamer, for example, was conct:rned in the theories of 
.. tradition" thar Balkin wishes to rt~j ect.3s 
Balkin 's analysis of memes adds nothing to our understanding of 
huma n understanding. Charny concludes, because Balkin provides no 
guidance for determining how me mes work in human settings. Balkin 
simply cannot explain how memes "function" or "survive" in the 
cultural realm. except to note the factors (such as their cognitive fit 
with human memories) that influence this process."' Charny 
concludes that Balkin must develop his references to rhetoric in 
greater detail, because the survival of memes within a culture is 
linked to their persuasive effects in ongoing rhetorical exchanges.4(1 
16(1~ (199\1) (reviewine LIALKI!'i, supra note 2). 
J7. St·e BALKIN. l ii{JNI note 2. at 51-54. Balkin concedes that genetic mutation is relatively 
rare and, at lt:a~t for the: nwmcnl. random. whereas mcmctic mutation is constant because 
memes ar.: part of a dynamic symbolic ~tructure of meaning. ·'Human beings arc not passive 
receptor; or men1cs: they are acti\'e processor;, and n:combiners of the cullural messages and 
skills they receivL' In>m others.'· /d. at 52. l t is precisely the innovations of human actor~ that a 
mcmc.tic analysis rcnd~rs obscure, espew!lly when Balkin writes: ··Meme> 'usc· people tor the 
purpcosc of their own propagation . . . [T]hey >urvivc. reproduce. and propagate because it 
advantages them."' Jd. at 61. 
J!!. Charny . . <11pra note 36, al t605·06. 
J9. s .. ~ id. al t(,()6 07. 
~~~- Chamy writes: 
The public space i> not a collection of rational selves. but a swarm of viral plirticles of 
information. What rescues this from utter bleakness is I he (individually limited though 
collectively <.l"tortninative) power M "ach self to influence merncoc propagation 
(1hmugh a postrnod.,rn rhetorical exchange), and the celebratory sen~~ in which thi~ 
diversity :<pawns id<!a ls and aspirations thtll might elude a more t ightly controlled 
communal dbcuursc. 
/d. a t lo14. As I discus' bdow. Oadarncr emphasizes this same rhetorical dimension in a 
manner that answers lhe immcdiut~ly voiced fear that a rhetorical a nalysis leads lo the 
conclusion that cultural ~on ware evolves out of a chaotic. "'anything goes:· multicultural clash of 
incommensurable claims. 
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Charny's insight is worth developing in detail: Gadamer's 
concept of tradition proves to be a much better vehicle for de veloping 
the modeJ of human understanding that Balkin and Gadamer share. 
Because Gadamer conceives of tradition as an ongoing conversation 
in which individuals already find themselves, he recuperates the 
rhetorical tradition in order to explain (returning to Balkin 's 
terminology) how cultural software evolves within an economy of 
exchange. G adamer argues that genuine rhetoric concerns the 
"discovery and transmission of insight and knowledge," an experience 
that is exemplified in the ''art of leading a conversation."41 Genuine 
rhetoric is distinguished from the "idle speculations of the Sophists" 
because it involves more than the manipulation of linguistic 
indeterminacy.~2 Construed not just as an opening to the world but 
also as a task or question that confronts the individual, tradition is not 
just a static accumulation of information. Instead, tradition is a 
never-ceasing dynamic of rhetorical exchanges occurring within a 
horizon that is defined by the historical effects of previous exchanges 
within the culture , and in which prejudices are appropriated and 
developed by human actors seeking to motivate others to act.43 
Balkin 's approach tends to conjure an image of an individual 
with her cultural software "in place" who later comes into contact 
with others in a manner that leads to slight modificatjons in her 
cultuJal software. But this picks up the story of human understanding 
far too late in the book. Om cultural software is not an operating 
program that is loaded into us and then later slightly modified, but 
instead is the product of a lifetime of understandings that bear the 
deep imprints of the tradition that enables unde rstanding. A person 
develops her cultural software before she is a conscious self by 
haltingly entering into an ongoing cultural conversation that 
Gadamer characterizes as tradition. This acculturation is linguis-
tically mediated in increasingly complex ways as the child learns to 
understand language, to speak, and ultimately to read and write, but 
acculturation is not solely linguistic in nature. The child learns 
nonlinguistic interactions as well, such as smiling, averting her eyes, 
or hugging another person in the appropriate contexts, all of which 
form the social context for her linguistically mediated participation in 
4 1. Hans-Gcorg Gadamer. The~ Expressive Pnwn of Language: On the Function of" 
Rhl'torif for Kn01\"ledf(e, 107 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANOIJAGE Ass'~ AM. 348, 3~0 (I 992). 
42. GADA~ER.SIIpT{, note 3. ar 19: set' ulso Gadamer. w.pra note 41. at 350. 
43. See. e.R .. Mootz. Rhcroricnl Knowledge, :mpro note 26 (drawing out the rhetoncal 
dimensions of Gatlamer·s hermeneutics). 
95fl CHJCAGO-Kt.NT LAW REVIEW !Vol. 76:945 
sociaJ exchanges. The important point is that she will not experience 
her introduction to this ongoing conversation as encounter with an 
"external" tradition for the simple reason that it is this conversation 
that provides her with the resources for becoming conversant and 
participating in the activity of understanding. Tradition is the shared 
realm of understanding that opens a world for individuals to join in its 
ongoing economy of exchange. Once the individual becomes 
conversant she cannot escape tradition and start a new conversation, 
but instead can only participate as a conversation partner within a 
constantly evolving tradition. 
It is a profound mistake, then , to regard tradition as merely a 
starting point of understanding that is later surpassed by the 
individual. Human understanding is traditionary (finite and histor-
ically conditioned) yet also inventive (the product of rhetorical 
exchanges oriented to persuasion). Balkin 's memetic analysis could 
account, at most, for habit and convention, but it provides little 
guidance for explaining what 1 have elsewhere termed " rbetoricaJ 
knowledge."~ Rhetorical knowledge emerges out of the preunder-
standings embedded in patterns of social discourse and interaction , 
but it is distinguished from mere convention by the invemive 
representation and reinscription of "prejudices" by the rhetorical 
actor. Surveying accepted topics, norms, and opinions as resources 
for confronting the demands of the present, individuals continually 
conjoin these constitutive features of them elves and their society in 
unique ways. Balkin is certainly correct to look to cognitive science 
to help explain why certain "memes" are more available for rhetorical 
elaboration than others. However, Taylor and Charny are equally 
correct in emphasizing that this inquiry provides only one part of th~ 
picture of human understanding, and that it represents a relatively 
insignificant part if it is not successfully wedded to a broader 
hermeneutical and rhetorical investigation of why and how only a 
fraction of the cognitively accessible memes become important within 
a culture. 
This point can be recast by considering Balkin's use of the 
metaphor of evolution.45 Balkin appears to place equal weight on a 
Lamarckian conception of evolution (in which the organism directly 
responds to the demands of the environment with bricolage, leading 
44. For an extended d1scus~ion of "rhetorical knowledge·· that informs my discussion in 
this pnragraph. see Mootz. Rhecorical !<.now/edge, supru note 26. 
45. 1 am indebted to George Taylor's lead in making rh is argument. See Taylor. supra note 
35. at 8-13. 
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to unintended uses and effects that cumulate over time) and a 
Darwinian conception of evolution (in whlch random variations in 
memes are naturally selected over time according to their tendency to 
support the organism's adaptation to a changing environment) . .u; 
Gadamer's rhetorical conception of tradition emphasizes the 
Lamarckian sense of evolution, and thereby provides a necessary 
corrective to Balkin's tendency to discount human agency. The 
survival of memes is not particularly interesting or significant at the 
level of determining the qualities that render information easily 
cognized. The more fundamental question is how individuals 
discriminate among numerous cognitively adequate memes for the 
purpose of addressing contemporary questions and challenges:17 Of 
course, it bears emphasis that Balkin and Gadamer agree that human 
agency must not be characterized as the sovereign act of the cogito. 
However, Gadamer's characterization of tradition as an ongoing 
conversation that provokes and guides rhetorical exchanges provides 
a superior explanation of the insight that he shares with Balkin: 
cultural knowledge is neither the master of, nor just a tool available 
to, the individual.4x Tradition stands over and above individual claims 
to selfhood, even as the individual rhetorically refashions traditionary 
prejudices in conversational exchanges that seek to motivate action in 
response to the practical demands presented by changing circum-
stances. 
In short, Balkin's efforts to distinguish Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics prove to be in vain. Gadamer's philosophy provides a 
better account of the model of human understanding that he (largely) 
4(l. B ALKI N. supra note 2. at 35-41. 
47. David Cbamy makes this poin t in a similar manner. See Charny . . mprn note 36, at 16l5. 
lntcrcsungly, it appears that a Lamarckian approach may be gaining respectability even in 
biolo.ey Y.-\th respect to specific evolutionary processes. See EDWARD .1. STEELE ET AL., 
LAMIAROCS SIGNATURE: H O W RETROGENES ARE C H ANGING DARWIN'S NATURAL 
SELEC.:TION PARADIGM (1998) (arguing that immunieies acquired during a parent's Ji(e might, in 
some respects. be passed on to a child). 
48. In his concluding chapter. Balkin makes this point in a manner tha t calls to mind the 
point of Gadarner's emphasis on tradition and rhetoric in Truth and MetJwd . Balkin writes: 
I noted earlier that ~~oe human beings exist in a great tide of informational 
evolution. Yet our participation in the tide of cu ltu ral evolution does no t mean that 
we lack agency. Our cultura l software surely a ffects our behavior; our actions a lways 
have unintended consequcne<:s. But it is a far cry from recognizing this to infe rring 
that we a rc mere instruments of memetic evolution. We must reject a sinaplistic 
eithe r/or view which insists that either we are in full control of the developnlent o f our 
memes or they are in full wratrol of us . 
. . . We are active particip;Jnts in the growth and spr~ad of cultural software .' even 
if we do not have full wntrul ove r the terms of its evolutio n. 
BALKIN. supra note 2, at 293. 
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shares with Balkin. At the level of describing human understanding, 
Balkin's differing approach generates some unnecessary tensions, 
albeit tensions which appear to be generally harmless to this point. 
However, as Balkin proceeds to develop his theory of ideology and 
critique. the significance of his deviation from Gadamer becomes 
apparent. In the next part of the Article I will describe and criticize 
Balkin's conceptions of ideology and critique. and then in Part III I 
will defend Gadamer's very different accowlt of ideology critique. 
Gadamer's use of the concept of tradition within the broader 
metaphor of understanding as a conversation charts a productive 
course for postmodern critical theory that adheres to the model of 
human understanding that Balkin purports to defend. 
II. IDEOLOGY. CRITIQUE, AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT: 
BALKIN'S Q UEST TO REPROGRAM CULTURAL SOFTWARE 
A. I deological £/feces 
Balkin contends that a new theory of ideology follows from his 
model of human understanding. He begins by rejecting "pejorative" 
approaches that characterize ideology as the product of defective 
modes of understanding. "'Pejorative conceptions usually assume a 
unidirectional model of ideological analysis: the ideology-free analyst 
locates and criticizes ideology in the ideological1y deluded analysand. 
D isagreements between analyst and analysand about social reality are 
explained as ideological delusion on the part of the analysand."49 
Pejorative accounts of ideology inevitably collapse under the weight 
of self-reference, though, because there can be no guarantee that it is 
not the critic who is employing defective tools of understanding.50 
The problem of self-reference becomes acute when competing camps 
accuse each other of false consciousness and ideological delusion, 
since there is no independent standard that can adjudicate which 
group is engaged in ideological thinking. As a result. the proponents 
of a pejorative account of ideology cannot avoid the relativist morass 
that postmodern thinkers have openly embraced, even if the resulting 
relativism is punctuated by the sloganeering and accusations of those 
who remain convinced of the authenticity of their own worldview. 
Pejorative accounts of ideology fail because they define ideology 
as the product of defective tools of understanding. But, as Balkin 
49. ld. at 126. 
50. /d. at 125. 
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emphasizes, t.he mechanisms of understanding are themselves neither 
true nor false, neither just nor unjust. He insists that ideology is not 
··something separate from cultural understanding. The mechanisms 
of what we call ideological thinking are no different in kind from the 
ordinary forms of thought. There is not a separate set of devices that 
constitute 'the ideological' and another set that constitute 'the 
nonideological."'51 All mechanisms of understanding are capable of 
fostering both just and unjust social conditions. Ideology is one 
possible effect of ordinary mechanisms of understanding, an effect 
that occurs "when cultural software 'goes wrong' in some important 
way."52 Consequen tly, the ''study of ideology .. . might be summa-
rized as the study of 'when good heuristics go bad,'"53 or, more 
descriptively. as the study of how a heuristic with the potential for just 
effects wi th in society can in certain contexts foster injustice. Balkin 
contends that the '·tools of understand ing that are entirely benign in 
some circumstances may become malignant if too much is demanded 
of them or if the context in which they are employed changes 
sufficiently. "~J For example, one generation might employ the 
metaphor of working to build a "color blind" society for the purpose 
of overcoming racism, but a later generation might invoke the 
metaphor to attack affirmative action programs, in effect eliding 
systemic "white privilege" and solidifying gross inequalities based on 
race. 
If ideology is not a defective mode of understanding, but instead 
is equated with the detrimental effects that certain understandings 
have within a social context, then the identification and critique of 
ideology is possible only if the critical theorist has a standard against 
which to judge the effects of the understandings generated by cultural 
software. Identifying the mechanisms of understanding is a 
descriptive task, but Balkin stresses that ideological analysis 
"necessarily has a normative dimension. It cannot be value free but 
must presuppose a view about what is good and bad , advantageous 
and disadvantageous, just and unjust. "5~ Balkin readily acknowledges 
that he has not avoided the problem of self-reference by invoking a 
normative criterion of justice. All human understanding is a function 
of ambivalent mechanisms of understanding, and so the critic can 
51. ld. at 107. 
52. ld. at l lU. 
53. ld. a1 l ilS. 
54. fd. a 1 108. 
55. ld. at 111. 
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define the standard of "justice" according to which she judges 
idcologic.:al effects on.ly by employing the very same mechanisms of 
understanding that give rise to the potentially ideological beliefs. Put 
simply, the critic cannot step outside the limitations of her cultural 
software in order to percdve a ''pure" standard of justice against 
which ordinary thinking can be judged.~" 
Critics will offer the obvious rejoinder that "Balkin does not 
suggest how he has been able to either control or transcend his own 
social construction."57 However, Balkin insists that the ambivalent 
character of our tools of understanding reveals that the problem of 
self-reference is rt!ally no problem at all. 
How does an ambivalent conception of ideology deal with the 
problem of self-reference ... ? It accepts the inevitability of self-
reference but argues-consistent with the general conception of 
ambiva.lence-that this feature of our !thought does not necessarily 
make ideological analysis futile or unhelpful. Quite the contra ry: 
the ability of thought to turn upon itself is a prerequisite for an 
ade4uate analysis of ideological thinking.SII 
In other words, Balkin claims that self-reference is not an obstacle to 
the critique of ideology, but instead makes the critique of ideology 
possible. 
Balkin expressly follows Gadamer' s analysis to explain how the 
self-referential character of thought works to reveal ideological 
effects. An individual's cultural software is a prejudiced structure of 
preunderstanding that empowers understanding precisely by limiting 
the possibilities.'9 Because no person, even the critic of ideology, can 
escape entirely from her prejudiced horizon, the critic must constantly 
assess the possibility that it is her own thinking that is leading to 
ideological effects rather than the understanding that she is 
analyzing.1111 Again expressly adopting Gadamer's analysis, Balkin 
argues that the critique of ideology requires a constant check of one's 
own binses and prejudices by suspending the inevitable urge to brand 
those who have different understandings as suffering from false 
consciousness."' In addition to searching for ideological effects in 
56. Su id. at 134 (arguing lha t " there is no point at which we abandon the rool~ of 
undtlr:;tandmgso rhar we might criticillly reflect upon aU o{ them"). 
57. Michael J. Gerhardt , Deconstruc:tinJI Balkin. ;1 GREEN BAG 2d 219, 22.2 ( 1999) 
(reviewing BALKIN, supra note 2). 
58. BALKIN. supra note 2, ar 127. 
59. S"f.' icl. at 311 n.l3 (citing Gadamer's analysis o r prejudices). 
60. ld. at 129. 
61. See id. at 31 1 n.l4 (citing Gada mer'~ analy~is of rhe ··henmneutic circle"). 
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patterns of understanding within a society, then, the cnt1c must 
constantly assess the potential tha t her own understanding leads to 
ideological effects. 
Successful ideological analysis is possible because and to the 
extent that the analyst 's tools of understanding enable her to 
understand social conditions well enough to perform the analysis. 
For precisely the same reason. however, it is possible that the 
analysand has a grasp of social conditions that conflicts with the 
analysl's but ·is nevertheless equally adequate or even more valid. 
The analysand may in fact see something that the analysl does not 
see as clearly. By considering how the analysand 's thought might 
have elements of truth or justice in it. the analyst can attempt to 
analyze and modify her own views. By using the beliefs and 
opinions of others as a partial check on the analyst's own, 
ideological analysis attempts to improve social understanding not 
only for the analysand but for the analyst as well. 
I call this dialectical approach to the study of ideology or 
cultural software a critical approach. By critical I do not mean the 
discovery of flaws or defects in the lhought of another person but 
rather a process of self-reflection and self-discovery that is part and 
parcel of the ideological analysis of Lhe thought of other persons. 
A critical approach is inevitably a self-critical approach.62 
This passage is worth quoting at length , because at first glance Balkin 
appears to embrace Gadamer's dialogical account of human 
understanding, in which a fusion of horizons occurs that moves 
beyond the initial understandings of bo th dialogue partners. 
Bu t this convergence with Gadamer's philosophy presents a 
problem for Balki n. If ideological analysis is nothing other than a 
dialogical engagement in which the critic and her conversational 
partner both reach new understandings, then ideological analysis 
cannot be diffe rentiated from simple human understanding. This is 
problematic because the traditional goal of critical theory is to 
identify those circumstances in which an apparent fusion of horizons 
in fact represents ideological effects. Balkin responds to this problem 
by reinvesting the critic with the power to determine the scope of her 
engagement with the o the r, so as to avoid being drawn into 
ideological beliefs that co-opt her understanding.63 Balkin regards 
this wariness of the other as a crucial difference that distinguishes his 
approach from G adamer's approach.~4 In the above-quoted passage, 
for example. Balkin suggests that the critic chooses to use the beliefs 
62. /d. at 130. 
6::1. lrJ. at 130·32. 
04. /r/. ut313n.l5. 
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and opinions of others as a parrial check on her own prejudices. The 
analyst cannot dominate her subject as if the other is an object of 
study. because the analys t's tools of understanding are no less 
ambivalent than her s ubject's tools; nevertheless, the analyst also 
must guard against becoming ensnared in the subject's ideological 
thinking. Both prospects represent unavoidable .. risks" of self-
referential critical thinking that the crit ic of ideology must carefully 
avoid. 
It should be clear tha t Balkin has succeeded only in restating the 
problems that all theories of ideology and critique confront.r.s 
Balkin's argument to this point consists of a few key claims. First, the 
critic must guard against the ideological effects of her own cultural 
software while also guarding against being co-opted by the ideological 
effects of the social understandings that she is analyzing. Second, the 
critic cannot identify ideological effects as tl1e products of certain 
defective tools of understanding because these tools arc ambivalent; 
ideological effects are detem1ined only by reference to a conception 
of justice as applied in a particular social context. Finally. 
conceptions of justice are themselves understood only by means of 
cultural software. Balkin thus acknowledges 
the ordinariness and even the banality of the processes by which we 
understand ourselves and the social world around us .. .. 
Jdeological analysi5 is not a mac;tc r d iscipline that can promise to 
regulate or direct our understanding of the social world. Rather. it 
is a form of knowledge acquisition just like the forms it purports to 
study and critique:>• 
Balkin faces an obvious challenge: What can possibly ground the 
critique of ideology if tllese three presuppositions hold true? 
B. Justice Jls Transcenrfenr 
In order to address this challenge and overcome an apparent 
roadblock to defining critical theory, Balkin suddenly abandons his 
model of human understanding. As Step Feldman comments, it is as 
if Balkin experiences ''postmodern vertigo" at this juncture and reacts 
instinctive ly by reach ing down and grabbing "for a piece of firm, 
65. Michael Gerhanlt notes tllat Balkin "suggests that w~~: cao re~olve this paradox (of s:elf-
rcferenc~] by trying to be cundid with ourselves anc! other~ about the sources of our own 
think ing.- hut Balkin su~cds only in making .. an ;~spi..-at ional declaration:· which .. is not the 
>arne tl-jng as acrua lly overcoming it or provmg we have overcome it." Gerhardt . mpra note 57. 
at 223. 
66. BALKIN. suprn note 2. at 135-37 (d iscussi111g Stanley Fish·~ critiqu.: o{ t h~ quest to 
d~evdop en tica l self-consciousness with nppnwal). 
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modernist ground. ''"7 Balkin avoids a relativist conclusion to his 
argume nt by contending that "ideological analysis, and indeed all 
moral discourse, must presuppose a transcendent value of justice. 
Tools of undt:rsta nding produced by cultures lo pursue justice are 
articulations of this value."~.>~~ The transcendent value of justice is an 
inchoate ''ideal .. . demand or longing" that we attempt to under-
stand through its "incomplete and imperfect" articulation with the 
tools of cultural understanding; it is not reducible to these historical 
articulations, but rather is the presupposition for them.69 The 
transcendent ideal of justice is an abiding guarantor of the critical 
project. 
Balkin is quite clear that the transcendent value of justice is a 
regulative ideal rather than a delailed set of substantive prescriptions. 
Justice is immanent within reality, but only a s an ··inexhaustible" and 
''indeterminate de mand.'. 70 Balkin argues that we use the tools of 
understanding to implement justice within a particular context, and 
that we can never exhaustively implement justice within existing 
social institutions. ''To be just we must construct examples of justice 
using the indeterminate urge for justice as our goad rather than as our 
guide."71 Balkin credits H abermas's proceduralist account of reason 
for revealing that the very ·'rhetorica l structure of dialogic encounters 
reveals the regulative nature of transcendent ideals in a particula.rly 
striking way, "72 but he also argues that there is a substantive 
dimension to the transcendent ideal o f justice. 
Even when we accuse our interlocutors of great evils, we make 
reference to a common value of justice that we claim lhey have 
fa iled to live up to. And their defense, even if unconvincing to us, 
will appeal to reasons that they insist should persuade us and 
exculpate them. When we criticize our opponent to a 1hird party, 
we invoke an ideal of justice that applies not only to ourselves and 
the audience, but to the pe rson we critici7.e. 
In short. transcendent ideals are presupposed by the rhetorical 
situation of having to persuade an audience. They seem to spring 
forth magically from the rhetorical encoun ter. Like a beautiful 
n7. St.:phen M. Feldman. The Pulirics of Po.mnodem 11msprudence. 95 MtCll. L. REV. 166, 
193 (19\lt\). Fddman is discus.~ing an earlier article io which Balkin fi rst make& the 
transcende ntal argument that is CIHltinued. in mod ified l'o rrn, in Balkin's book. See J .M. Balkin, 
Trans(elldl!fllul Deconslmcliou. Transcendem.lustice, 92 Mt("t t. L. REv. 1131 (1994). 
6H. BALlO~. supm no1e 2. ~ ~ 1·1:1. 
69. !d. at 144. 
70. /d. at ltil. 
71. /d. at 162. 
72. IJ. at 148. 
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mosaic whose patte rn emerges from the juxtaposition of diverse 
sto nes. the framework of transcendent ideals that undergirds the 
rhetorical situation emerges through the confrontation between 
different and conflicting perspectives.'3 
Ideological analysis simply represents a special case of dialogue, in 
which the critic must presuppose transcendent ideals of justice in 
order to critically assess her understandings and the social under-
standings that she is studying. The transcendent ideal girds critical 
inquiry amidst historical flux: "The variance of history is coherent 
because we understand it against the background of the 
transcendent. "H 
The transcendental argument bears a heavy burden in Balkin's 
theory, and it does so uneasily. l f Balkin claims that justice is a 
transcendent value only for the purpose of reinforcing the fact that 
our history and cultural practices evidence attempts to work out the 
requirements of a value that cannot be fully defined, then ascribing 
transcendent status appears to do no work; in this case, Balkin is 
better left with his emphasis on dialogic engagemenP.' However, 
with his mosaic metaphor, Balkin appears to suggest that the 
transcendent value of justice is more in the nature of an organizing 
force that has a gravitational effect on the otherwise fragmented 
rhetorical activities of persons who inevitably are limited by their 
historically and socially conditioned tools of understanding. The 
transcendent value exerts a mysterious force. subsiding below 
rhetorical exchanges as some kind of unifying principle. In this case. 
the transcendental argument does work for Balkin, but is 
unconvincing and misleading. 
To his credit, Balkin has effectively undermined the lingering 
hopes for developing a "pejorative" theory of ideology and has 
squarely presen ted the problem of a postmodern theory of ideology 
and critique. Unfortunately, although there is some ambigui ty in 
what Balkin intends to convey by claiming that justice is a 
transcendenta l organizing drive that subtends critical theory. his 
recourse to a transcendent value of justice appears to be either an 
73. /d. at149. 
74. It/. at 170. 
75. A t several points Balkin emphasizes that the transcendental argument is a means of 
breakmg down parochialism and acknowledging the ahsencc of a determinate amJ unvarying 
conceptoon of the "good life.'' Set<' id. at 148. However. Balkin does not explain why he feels 
compelled to identify a transcendent ideal outside !he dialogtc confrontation with anNhcr 
person to accomplish this goal, since the dialogic encounter ts a dirC'cl and Utlmt.'c.!iatcd 
e xperiC'nce of CtllC 's parochialism. 
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empty gesture or a betrayal of his analysis of human understanding. 
Under one reading, Balkin is arguing that human nature includes a 
drive toward justice that is presupposed by, and evident in, every 
human interaction. This ··strong transcendental argument" com-
plete ly undercuts his model of human understanding by positing a 
timeless and universal substrate upon which critical theory builds. i6 
As several reviewers have emphasized, human history undercuts 
Balkin's claim: H seems all too obvious that some individua Is interact 
with others in a manner that evidences, if anything, an inexhaustible 
urge toward violence and domination.77 The ·'strong transcendental 
argument" attempts to assume away the problem that Balkin poses 
for himself. 
Under a different reading, Balkin proposes a "weak tran-
scendental argument" that posits the urge toward justice as a 
presupposition only of arguments about justice itself. Even if some 
people act without any reference to a concept of justice, the argument 
would run, those who seek to orie.nt their behavior in accord with 
justice necessarily presuppose a transcendent value. But the weak 
transcendental argument is unpersuasive on two very different fronts. 
On one hand , there is no explanation why the transcendent value 
cannot be fully apprehended and implemented, as a religious believer 
might argue in the course of developing a substantive natural law 
theory. On the other hand, this argument does little to dispel the 
fears of nihilism. As Charny observes, ·•rt is quite a leap ... to start 
from the requirement of value judgment to understand human action, 
and to end up with the particular type of value judgment needed for 
ideological critique as Balkin imagines it. " 7~ Balkin's transcendental 
argument appears to be an intellectual form of whistling in the dark 
to convince himself that he is not walking alone. 
Balkin's transcendental argument encounters these difficulties 
for a very simple reason. After meticulously describing human 
understanding as the historical cumulation of bricolage produced by 
an economy of exchange, he abandons a thoroughly temporal 
approach to human understanding. Although every individual effort 
to act justly remains temporal in his account, the purpose of Jtis 
transcendental argument is to rise above the flux of existence even if 
only to posit a motivating gesture that remains noncontingent. The 
76. See Taylor . . ~upra note 35. at 24-21>. 
77. !d. at 2S: vee Feldm<ln. s11pra note 67. at 200. 
7K Charny. supra note 36. at 1609. 
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messy problem of making value judgments, of bringing the 
transcendental value of justice to bear in a particular context, is 
superceded by the abidjog transcendental ideal of justice. But as Step 
Feldman recalls, ''Even if we are born with some precultural drives or 
values-such as justice-our being-in-the-world is so culturally 
saturored that a search for a precultural pearl buried somewhere 
beneath the cultural waves seems a t best irrelevant and at worst 
nonsensicai. ''N There simply seems to be no point to Balkjn's 
transcendental turn. 
Anticipating strong negative reactions to his recourse to 
transcendentalism, in the final analysis Balkin defends his 
transcendental argument on pragmatic grounds by claiming that he 
provides the ''most adequate way of describing this inadequacy [or 
the human predicament]" at this time.xn Balkin concedes that his 
analysis, like all cultural arti cul ations, is subject to revision if it proves 
to be inadequate for articulating features of human life-such as 
justice- which are not "wholly contingent" and do not exist "wholly 
internal to our discourse. " x• Balkin claims only that, at Ibis point in 
history, a transcendent conception of justice best serves our purposes 
in moving forward. Of course, his modesty is simply another 
rhetorical device for reaffirming the timeless and universal qualities 
of the transcendent value of justice. As he observes, "Our 
conceptions are revisable only because there is something against 
which we revise them. ''x2 
I believe that Balkin has hacked himself, admittedly with some 
quite impressive footwork, into a corner. The transcendental 
argument lodges the value of justice beyond the dialogue rather than 
in the diaJogue. This bas profound consequences. lf a transcendent 
value of justice exists beyond immediate rhetorical exchanges, then 
the critic is quite capable of pursuing an application of this 
transcendent value in soli tary thought. Balkin emphasizes the 
importance of challenging one's presuppositions by conversing with 
others, but Balkin 's critic is never wholly given over to the dialogue. 
As he emphasizes, 
A n im portant difference between a critical approach and 
Gadamer's hermeneutics is that we do not engage in this approach 
with the goal of reacl1ing an agreement with the analysand. Rather, 
79. Feldman .. wpra note 67. a l 197-':IR. 
liO. BALKI:-:, supm note 2. 31 16R 
81. /d. 
82. [d. 
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we are interested in discovering both what we can learn from the 
analysand and whal we ultimately cannot agree with because of the 
ideological effects we perceive in the analysand's thought.:!J 
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A dialogue partner can provide important information in the effort to 
develop a better articulation of the transcendent conception of 
justice, but ultimately in Balkin 's theory it is the critic who must 
carefully determine to what extent the other person may serve this 
useful function in the critical project. The other person is a source of 
information and potentially a corrective challenge to the critic's 
shortsightedness, but the other person is not empowered to set the 
agenda by posing the questions that the critic addresses. The critic 
remains. to borrow Pierre Schl ag's felicitous phrase, a "relatively 
autonomous self" in charge of her critical inquiry.K4 
Balkin's cdtic is too discern ing and selective. In the end, he falls 
back on a traditional subject-centered approach, underwritten with a 
transcendental argument. Extending Balkin's central metaphor, his 
critic appears to be a (cultural) software programmer who works to 
e liminate bugs in the social system by seeking input from others, but 
ultimately the critic is responsible for upgrading the program \vith 
reference to an ideal that is beyond actual collaborative endeavors 
with other programmers. The critique of ideology is the quest to 
reprogram cultural software. The critic reads tools of understanding 
like lines of code. and assesses the merits and demerits of their 
deployment in various contexts against a baseline understanding of 
justice. 
My thesis is that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides 
a sophisticated account of ideology and critique that remains 
consistent with the broad contours of postmodem sensibilities 
without disavowing the reality of reason<~ ble dialogue oriented 
toward emancipation. Gadamer overcomes the probl.ems that Balkin 
encounters by resolutely adhering to his model of human 
understanding in the face of powerful pressures and desires to 
a rticulate a so]jd, even if transcendental and rather than empirical, 
grounding for critical inquiry. Balkin's impressive accomplishments 
fall short, but Balkin does reframe the issues sufficiently to require a 
new reading of Gadamer's philosophy. In the concluding section , 1 
will offer a reading of Gadamer's philosophy that responds to 
Balkin's challenge and renders explicit certain features of Gadamer's 
!!3. /d.a! 313n.15. 
!i~. See MoOi l . Rule of L a"·· supra note 2ft. a t 10~.{)5 (u iscussing Schlag·s crit icism of 
Balkin for C0·0pring and domesticating the mJ ically decentering activi ty of dcconstruclion). 
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approach that traditionally have been underemphasized but which 
point the way to a more fruitful approach to the problem of ideology 
critique in a postmodern world. 
III. CRITICAL HERM ENEUTICS .t\.ND THE RHETORICAL 
DEVELOPMENTOFTRADITJON: A GADAMERIAN ACCOUNTOF 
IDEOLOGY AND CRITIQUE 
Gadamer·s philosophical hermeneutics responds to the fear that 
apparently genuine interpretive practices might in fact be masking 
power relationships that are maintained by ideology rather than 
consensus. This claim is not necessarily at odds with the prevailing 
opinion that philosophical hermeneutics precludes effective critkal 
theory, since the proponents of critical theory generally advocate a 
strong conception of theory that Gadamer proper ly rejects. My 
reading of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics recovers the 
experience of critique within interpretive practices and connects this 
experience with a theoretical attitude that cannot be sharply 
distinguished from practical engagements.115 My Gadamerian defense 
of critical theory begins with an account of the "postmodern self" 
who acts as the critic, describing the rhetorical space of critical agency 
in the wake of the collapse of the subject-centered philosophical 
tradition. I continue by describing the critical practices of this 
postmodern self and relate these practices to Gadamer's model of 
human understanding. J enlist two skilled guides to assisr my effort to 
articulate a critical hermeneutics that is grounded in Gadamerian 
premises but that pre~ses beyond Gadamer's direct concerns: Calvin 
Schrag and P. Christopher Smith. 
A. Locating the Postmodern Self 
Balkin struggles to finesse the difficult question of human 
agency. On one hand, he argues that cultural software is "in" every 
individual, constituting and enabling agency. On the other hand , he 
treats the evolution of memes and the operation of the tools of 
understanding as distinct topics of study, suggesting that cultural 
85. I re.adily admit that my reading of Gadamer'!; hermem:utics is not the only plausible 
reading. and I ma ke no cla1m that I have uniquely captured Gadnmo:r's intentions. Such 
pretensions obviously would contradict the .:eutml teachings of philosophkal hermeneutics. 
However. I defend my readmg of Gndnmer·s philosophical hermeneutics as a charitnble 
extension of his work that can provide an accourll of cri tical theory under postmodem 
conditions. 
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understandings are structurally defined. This ambivalence is 
compounded by his transcendental argument. On one hand Balkin 
seems to suggest that individuals transcend their situation by virtue of 
a power within them, but, on the other hand, the transcendent status 
of justice appears to bP. a dynamism to which individuals are subject. 
Consequently, it is unclear how the critic is able to identify and 
overcome ideology under Balkin's account. He argues that the critic 
must seek out interlocutors to ensure that she avoids ideological 
effects in her own thinking, but also that the critic must vigilantly 
guard against being co-opted by the other's ideological thinking. In 
the end, Balkin is just making the commonsense claim that 
individuals act upon their cultural software in reflective ways but that 
they do so only through their cultural software. To avoid the 
conundrums that Balkin encounters, it is necessary to describe this 
reflexive situation in greater detail and with more nuance. 
Calvin Schrag's illuminating account of the postmodern self helps 
to situate an account of critical theory. Schrag argues that subjectivity 
inheres in "communicative praxis." and he locates critical agency in a 
"transversal rationality'' that is neither pre-given, nor does it 
dissemble into postmodern fragmentation.~!<~ In a recent series of 
lectures, Schrag distills his work in an effort "to resituate and refigure 
the portrait of the human self,"~7 concluding that 
In the aftermath of the deconstruction of traditional metaphysics 
and epistemology, a new self emerges, like the phoenix arising from 
its ashes- a praxis-oriented self, defined by its communicative 
practices. oriented toward an understanding of itself in its 
discourse. its action, its being with others. and its experience of 
transcendence .s~ 
Schrag persuasively describes how this postmetaphysical self is 
capable of acting reflectively and has sufficient resources for engaging 
811. See CALVIN 0. SCHRAG. COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS AND THE SPACE OF SUJ:IJECTIVITY 
(L9!!6) (hereinafter SCHRAG, COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS); CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, THE 
RESOL'RCES OF RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE (1992) 
(hereinafter SCHRAG. RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY). 
li7. CALVIN 0. SCHRAG. THE SELf. AfTER POSTMODERNITY 8 (1997). This short book. is 
an edited version of Schrag's 1995 Gilbert Ryle lectures at Tren t University. Consequently, it i s 
wonderfully succinct and sugg~slive, and it provides a good window into Schrag's philosophy. 
1\K !d. at 9. Schrag challenges Lhe postmodern tendency to elimina te the "self" as a topic 
of discussion: 
Although it may be problematic to begin with the subject, eithu as an epistemological 
and sclf-renecting suhject or as an existentially isolated self. one stm has to end with 
the subject. duly decentered and refigured .... The suhject finds a new space as an 
em"'rgent within the dynamics of discursive and inst itutional practices. 
SCHRAG. RESot.il<lES OF RA TIO;-.!ALITY . . mpra m>te H6. at 15\. 
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in critique, and so I turn to his account as the starting point for my 
project of defining a critical hermeneutics. 
Schrag contends thar. the self emerges as an achievement of 
discourse, an accomplishment that is ''acquired through a transversal 
extending over and lying across the multiple forms of speech and 
language games withoul coincidence with any one of them."~9 This 
dynamic achievement is falsified by the attempt to dissect discourse 
into its constituent units, and also by the attempt to cabin discourse 
with a structuralist "narratology."'~u Although such studies can yield 
knowledge, they inevitably obscure the living d iscourse in which the 
self emerges.91 Balkin's analysis of the tools of understanding 
provides a case in point, inasmuch as his rich descriptions of the tools 
tend to obscure the substantial abstraction that is required to 
construct distinct "tools" that yield to analysis. Schrag insists that we 
cannot confront the fears of postmodernism successfully without 
a ttending to the fact that the postmodern self who criticizes ideology 
emerges as a perfonnance within living discourse. 
Schrag emphasizes that individuals avoid dissolving into 
postmodern fragmentation through a narrative praxis that is 
intjmately tied to their actions within a social setting. The unity of the 
self is not guaranteed by an underlying logic to the forms of discourse, 
but rather is a performance that constantly unfolds within a web of 
historically conditioned discourses. "The narrati ng scif, as at once a 
sediment and a project. of discourse, constitutes and understands itself 
as emplotted within the interstices of stories already told and stories 
yet to be inscribed."¥2 Moreover, Schrag emphasizes tha t discourse is 
intimately tied to action- the speaking self is an acting self- and that 
actio ns similarly gain their salience only because they occur ·within a 
historical context.93 •·[T]he acting self is always embedded in social 
practices that reclaim a tradition and invoke a remembrance of things 
past in anticipation of future practices yet to be performed.''94 Schrag 
refigures this speaking and acting self by returning to Aristotle's 
Rhetoric. "More like a social practice than a technological tool, 
89. SCHRAG. supra note F:/. at 33. 
90. JtL at20-22. 
91. I d. at 22-23. 
92 Id. at 71. 
93. Schrag writes: "The placement of individual acts again~! thl' hackground of tmdiuonal 
and continuing social practices. rein~erting them into the on)!oing h:xture of commurucatiH: 
praxis, has the happy consequence of opening up a vision of the ~nlwinemenl of discourse and 
action in the economy of publ ic lik .. I d. at 73. 
94. /d. at 71. 
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rhetoric for Aristotle is the art of persuasion, soliciting deliberation, 
choice, and action, oriented toward the projected good for the 
polis.''95 The postmodern self is a rhetorical being whose persuasive 
narratives motivate her actions within a social setting of (more or 
less) similarly motivated actors. 
Schrag uses the term "communicative praxis" to refer to this 
''amalgam of discursive and nondiscursive practices, in which the 
meaning-engendering patterns of the spoken and the written word 
mix and mingle with meaning-laden actions" to coalesce into the 
postmodern self.% The crucial point is that deciding to act in a certain 
manner can be reasonable and ethical, as opposed to simply arbitrary, 
because communicative praxis involves a relinquishment of subjective 
control and a rhetorical participation in a shared logos. Schrag 
contends that there is an "incarnation of the logos within discourse 
and action in a hermeneutic of everyday life. Communicative praxis 
announces and displays reason as discourse . ... In entering discourse 
the logos is decentered and situated within the play of speaker and 
hearer as they seek consensus on that which is talked about."97 
Judgments about the '~fitting response'' to a particular social situation 
are rational, then, to the extent that they emerge from the 
"responsivity of an engaged and decentered moral self as it responds 
to the prior thought and action already inscribed within a historicized 
polis"; rationality does not issue from "an interior construct of a 
centered and sovereign subject" because no such subject exists.9~ The 
rhetorical rationality of communicative praxis IS inherently 
communal. 
To this point Schrag's account closely tracks Gadamer's 
hermeneutical argument that truth inheres in the playful recon-
stitution of tradition and that it is not the product of me thodological 
abstraction. However, Schrag argues that the communicative praxis 
of rhetorical actors engenders a critical distance that too often is 
suppressed in Gadamer's account. Schrag begins by locating the self 
in a "community" that "is more than customs and conventions of the 
tradition," and is ''more like the binding textuality of our discourse 
and the integrating purpose of our action. "'99 The speaking and acting 
95. !d. at 75 (discussing ARISTOTLE. RHETORIC. reprinted in THE BAS[C WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 1325 (Richard McKeon cd .. l 94J)). 
96. SCHRAG. COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS . .<upra note H6, at vii. 
97. !d. at !93. 
98. SCHRAG. RESOURCES 01' RATIONALITY. supra note 86. at 175·76. 
99. SCHRAG. sup111 note 1!7. at 87. 
974 CHlCA liO-K F.NJ LAW R EVIEW [Vol. 76:945 
subject is not just situated among other speaking and acting subjecrs; 
the self is a performance that emerges only by virtue of its responses 
to communa] practices. 100 This responsiveness includes a ''moment of 
critical agency" that Schrag does not fi nd in Gadarner's account of the 
development of a tradition, because the response to a communal 
logos is "not simply to accommodate oneself to that which is going 
on. It involves discernment, evaluation, [and] critical judgment," a 
pretheore tical and precognitive activity that Schrag terms "praxial 
critique."w1 The essence of praxial critique is that it is simultaneously 
an articulation and application of the criteria of judgment within a 
sh ifting historical horizon, and so rationality is seen as a performative 
constmction rather than adherence to preexistence criteria. 102 
I contend that Schrag's approach is wholly consistent with, and 
anticipated by. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It is easy 
enough to recast Gadarner's central insight-to understand is always 
to understand differently- by using Schrag's terminology: all 
understanding involves discernment, which is an activi ty that always 
includes a degree of critical d istanciation. Schrag elaborates this 
insight in great detail, though, demonstrating bow Gadamer's 
ontological commitments implicate a critical agency. Schrag agrees 
with Gadamer that discernment emerges from prej udgments within a 
traditionary horizon. but he emphasizes that there can be 
no discernment apart from a placing of these prejudgments, habits 
of thought. and action inlo question. The activation of such 
questioning requires the performance of distanciation, a stepping-
lOU. Schrag's analysis closely track' Gadiliilc r's de~cription of the priority of the question 
and the hermeneutica l s•gnificance of the o th er. 
[T]he chscourse and action tha t play such p rominent roles in the process o f self· 
formation arc always a discourse and action Tel,ponding to p rior discourse and p rior 
action. He nce the parameters for any socialization of the :.df have already b~en 
marked out. Within these paramet.ers the self n.:ver begins itself: it finds itself to be 
always already begun. And it i ~ 11lways already b~gun by vir tue of its rcsponsivity to 
the speech a nd actions o f others. 
Jd. at 91. This is a crucial aspect o r G adamer"s genuine postmvdern insights in the face of 
soph i>t ic uses of postmodcrn tlt ~o:me,. " Although we are sympath~ tic with the pos tmodern 
prohlematization of subjcct-ce nte n:J philoso phy, we are concerm;d abo ut the fai lure of nerve in 
postmodernism to aclcuowledgc the weight of tradition and the backg rcmnd or communicative 
practiCes aga inst which the subject assumes n new posture. .. SCHRAG, .R ESO URCES OP 
RATIOI>ALITY. supra note 1!6. at lSI. 
JU l. S<.·HRAG , supra n ote S7. at 99. For Schrag·s analysis of rationalily as pra xial criti<.jue, 
~CC SCHRAG. R ESOU RCES OP RATIONA LITY. supra note 86. at 50-67. 
102. Schrag quite e xp hcttly embraces a histor ica l a nd nonfouudational description ur 
cr itique. "Critique . refigured as praxiul critiq ue . enjoys neither modcm ity•s zeal for founda tions 
nor irs hopes for the attainme nt of Cc!riainry. II rests content to diSG<!rn and assess the p lay of 
fo rms o r thought and action agarns1 rhe background of changing and historically conditioned 
patterns of signification." SCI IRAO. R ESOURCES OF R AT10 1\ALITY . . <11pm not.: 86, at 57. 
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back, as it were, to discern what it is that has been going on behind 
our backs. Il is this performance of distanciation that provides the 
distinctively "critical'' moment of rationality as praxial critique .~''~ 
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Schrag is equally interested in challenging the excesses of 
postmodcrnism, and toward this end he insists that distanciation does 
not inevitably disintegrate into a bottomless and contextless 
negativity for the simple reason that critical distance is a product of 
social engagement and therefore presupposes community. The 
traditional picture of a solitary inquirer gaining a critical perspective 
on social practices by extricating herself from them is replaced by a 
reconceptualization of critical agency as a space that is opened only 
by virlue of preexisting social engagement. "The background 
solicitations of mutual understanding and solidarity in communal 
endeavors, inscribed within the participatory relationship, remain 
dialectically bonded with the assertion of self in the distanciating 
performance."104 Aligning himself with Gadamer, Schrag agrees that 
critical distanciation can never be completely severed from 
participatory belonging. But Schrag challenges Gadamer's biases by 
insisting that it must also follow that participatory belonging can 
never be insulated from critical distanciation. 
Schrag explains this inevitable commingling of critique and 
belonging by elaborating Gadamer's recovery of the classical 
rhetorical tradition that persisted until Vico's spirited last stand 
against the Cartesian paradigrn. 1 1'~ Rhetoric has become devalued as 
merel.y a strategic tool employed by a speaker upon an audience, but 
the classical tradition also emphasized the rhetorical engagements 
that structure an active field of persuasion and action. "The engaged 
rhetor and audience deploy their own inscriptions of sense and 
reference, and maneuver their own interventions, albeit not from the 
vantage point of founding and originating principles but rather from 
the perspective of involvement and responsiveness across a landscape 
of we-relationships. "t06 Rhetoric is the site of discernment, judgment, 
persuasion, and action, in which selves come to understand and act 
only by virtue of the provocations of their heterogeneous community. 
Rhetoric always involves a critical element, because these 
103. ld. at 6·1 (drawing from Ricoeur's work o n the dialectic of pnrticipnLitln und 
di~tanci3tion in inte> pretive encounters). 
104. /d. at 67. 
105. See id. at 121-22. 
!06. ld. Ill 131. 
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provocations pose questions that push the individual beyond received 
wisdom and into rhetorical inventiveness. 
The turn to rhetoric emphasizes the i.ntricate coexistence of 
dissensus and consensus. Rationality hesitantly emerges from within 
conflicting discourses and patterns of actions as a transversal 
connection that immediately is thrown into question again. 
Gadamer's emphasis on the background agreements subtending 
disagreements is best read in this light: he does not reach for 
substantive points of agreement that always remain unquestioned , but 
rather recognizes an "agreement" in the form of a communal 
engagement that lies transversally across disparate discourses and 
practices. Schrag explains: 
Reason remains transversal to the various forms of our personal 
and socia l forms of life. It lies across them diagonally; it is neither 
vertically transcendent to them nor horizontally immanent within 
them. It operates "between" them in such a manner that it is able 
to critique, articulate, and disclose them without achieving a 
coincidence with any particular form of discourse. thought, or 
action. The integrity of otherness- other forms of thought and 
other social practices-is maintained. accomplishing at once a 
better understanding of that which is one's own and a recognition 
of the need lo make accommodations and adjustments in the 
response to the presence of that which is other. Within such a 
scheme of things, the dynamics of transversal rationality falls out as 
a convergence without coincidence, an interplay without synthesis, 
an appropriation without totalization, and a unification that allows 
for difference. Such is the transversal dynamics that motivates 
rationality as a concernful struggle within communicative praxis. em 
Rhetorical engagement is the plying of this transversal rationality in 
discourse and action within the historical context of a community. 
My extended consideration of Schrag's defense of commu-
nicative praxis serves two purposes. First, the project of critical 
theory requires a critic, and so it is necessary to give an account of the 
situated self who will be charged with engaging in critique. Schrag 
connects Gadarner's ontology to a refigured "postmodern self" whose 
very social existence implies a critical distanciation. But this tells only 
half of the story. Second, there must also be a connection between 
this refigured postrnodern self and the project of critique. Schrag 
concludes that the pretheorctical critical distanciation of discernment 
provides sufficient motivation to underwrite the later critical projects 
consciously undertaken by the self as critic. 
1()7. fd. at 1515-SY. 
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Both intracultural and transcultural judgments and assessments 
retain their efficacy. Indeed, such judgments and assessments are 
unavoidable given the transversal play of o ur beliefs and practices 
in responding to tha t which is said and done. II is p recisely through 
this response-dynamics of communicative praxis. whereby we 
respond to the discourse and action that is thrust upon us, that the 
deployment of critique. articulation, a nd disclosure proceeds. 11lll 
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Transversal rationality is responsive to historical context and never 
issues from universal presuppositions, but because it operates across 
different discourses, disciplines, and contexts, it is never trapped 
within particular contingencies. It is the constant provocation of 
"otherness'' that situa tes reason outside of a closed context, even if it 
always is context-dependent. us 
B. Critique As Belonging: Original Argumem and rhe Theoretical 
Posture of Not-Knowing 
Schrag concludes that communicative praxis includes an element 
of transcendence that enables the postmodern subject to gain a 
critical perspective.110 Inspired by Kierkegaard,1" Schrag's approach 
is far more satisfactory than Balkin's transcendental turn. 
Nevertheless, it is more productive to avoid the language of 
transcendence altogether even while attending to the "transcending'' 
effect of being brought outside one's forestructure of prejudices in a 
hermeneutical encounter with another person.m Following the 
radical elements in tbe hermeneutical tradition of Heideggcr and 
108. /d. at 169. 
109. /d. <It !73. 
110. See SCHRAG. supra note 1\7. at 110-48 (chapt~r 4, entitled "The Self in Tran-
scendence·•). 
II J. See icl. at 111·18. 
112. Schrag argue:; that tbe socml dimension of language and action results in a ~urplus of 
practices as against any temporal and contextual articulation. Schrag argues that ttan~cc:ndcnce 
is e01beddcd witbin culturally s~dimen h:d practices by vtr tue of tbis surplus. but that our 
transversal rationality frees us from tltc confines of a parnrular scientitic. aesthetic. or e lhical-
pr~cticlll forms of di~ourse. Ht: argue~ that ·'the integrity of the historically specific discourse 
and action in each of the spheres is ~~fcguardcd by a radical trJnscendence. a horizon of 
o therness, an altt:rity of possibilities. that provides a shet:t anchor against any cultural 
hegemony. be it that of scient:Ism, morRli\m. aestheticism, or .:t.clesiasticism:· ScHHAG, supra 
note 87. at 133. Schrllg emphasite~ thai transcendence doesn't secure univocity. but instead 
simply opens a cri tical distance from current practices within which we can engage in dialogue 
with others, ··striving for convergence wtthout coincidence. conjuncture without concordance. 
seeking to understand within the cunte~t of d ifference ... • /d. at 148: seC! :mpru text 
accompanying note 107 (emphasizing thai transversal ra tionalrty is not v;:rticaUy transcendent 
to various forms of life. but rather lie~ ··hctween" tb.:m). I will avoid potential misunder-
standings of his approach, and potential pitfalls, by concentrating on the experi~ncc: of a lterity 
that lies at thl! root of his notion of tnwsc•:ndcncc. 
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Gadamer, Christopher Smith outlines just such an approach by 
concentrating on hermeneutical experience rather than hermeneutical 
philosophy. Smith argues that Heidegger's early essay, Ontology: 
Hermeneutics of Facticity, recuperates Aristotle's notion of 
hermeneutics as talking matters through as opposed to a method of 
textual exegesis, and that Gadamer radicalizes this notion in a 
manner that overcomes Heidegger's later distrust of the 
"everydayness" of dialogue. m Smith characterizes this radical 
hermeneutical experience as "original argument," signaling that this 
fundamentally social experience is contested, or argumentative, in 
some manner. By recovering the experience of original argument, 
Smith illuminates the critical space that Schrag identifies with 
transversal rationality. Significantly, Smith does so without reverting 
to any manner of transcendental argument. 
Smith seeks to uncover the original experience of argument that 
occurs in consultation and deliberation with another person, as 
opposed to the univocal and demonstrative model of argumentation 
that characterizes modern "reasoning." Contemporary accounts of 
reason present a picture of a self that formulates a position that later 
is converted to speech for the purpose of compelling another person's 
assent by demonstrating its unquestionable validity.114 In contrast, 
Smith emphasizes that the original experience of hearing another 
person within a shared language involves both a physical and 
cognitive response: the child hears the parent's rebuke and feels it, 
rather than simply processes it.' 15 Our thinking assent to a proposition 
that another person demonstrates to be true is always derivative of 
our participation in a shared language, because ''we never think in 
wordless ideas, but only in the words we have first heard from others 
and zhen hear again in our thinking." 11~> Demonstrating that one has 
"seen" something that another should also ··see" is always an 
113. See P. C'HRtSTOPI-IER SMITH. THE HERMENEUTICS OF 0RICliNAL ARGUMENT: 
DEMONSTRATION. DIALECTJC'. RHETORIC 13-34 (1998) (discu5sing MARTIN HEIDI:'GOER. 
ONTOLOGY: Tt-!E HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY (John Van Buren rrans .. Ind. Univ. Press 
1999) (1988)). Smith argues that Heidegger fails to pursue the project anticipated in his early 
lecture, icl. at 312 n.5. and throughout I he hook h" repeatedly invokes Gadaruer's focus on the 
social realm of everyday speech as an :mlidtlte to Heidegger·s elitist. monological quest to 
apprehend truth through poetry. 
114. P. Christopher Smith. The Uses of Arisror/e in Gadamer·s Recovery of Cunsu/rati1·.: 
Reasoning: Sunesis, Sungnome, Epieilceia, w1d Sumboulcucsthai. 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731, 
731 (2000). 
115. SMITH. supra note 113. at 219·20. 
116. Smith. supra note 114, at 740. 
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abstracti.on from an original being-with-another-in-language in which 
two people "hear" each other in deliberation. 
In other words, language, audible speech, is not invented by private 
individuals to signify thoughts they already have but is the gift of 
the community that allows the individual to think in the first place. 
Not cogito ergo sum ["I think, therefore I am"] is the truth of the 
matter. rather loquimur ergo c:ogito [·'We speak, therefore I 
t.hink"]. t17 
This originary hermeneutical bond is argumentative, though, because 
it does not simply involve the passive reception of a "message." 
Instead, two persons in consultation experience and adjust to each 
other, and it is this tension and adjustment that is the source of critical 
understanding. 
Original argument occurs in the hermeneutical-rbctorical realm 
of communicative praxis and is defined by three characteristics: (1) it 
consists of reasoning through use of topics or commonplaces in a 
naturally flowing conversation; (2) it concerns "contingent, temporal, 
ever self-contradictory things and comes, accordingly, only to 
likelihoods and inconclusive 'conclusions"'; and (3) it is voiced and 
heard in natural language.m Platonic argument covers over this 
original experience of deliberating together by privileging the narrow 
subset of demonstrative argument. Demonstrative argument involves 
the application of logic to concepts defined by symbolic language; it is 
an argumentative style that strives for the certainty of mathematics. 
Smith recognizes that Plato was attempting to answer the perceived 
threat of sophistic manipulation. He concludes, however, that by 
demanding such high standards of rationality Plato in fact facilitated 
our current state of affairs, which is defined by interminable partisan 
bickering over matters of politics and ethics. 11Y Smith's project is to 
read Aristotle's Rhetoric and other ancient texts destructively in 
order to uncover how original argument occurs in communication 
I 17. Jd. at 735. 
I I 8. SMITI I, supra note 113, at 4. 
119. [d. al 10 1l (concluding that the impossibility of meeting Platonic requirements means 
th<!t ·'apparent rutionality and pseudo-demonstrative 'logic' only hlind u~ to the irrational horror 
of it all " ). Smilh emphasizes this point in clear and succinct terms: 
And iL having seen that in mathe matical science <.lenJOnslration effectively wards off 
sophism. one were then LO set~k tO argue dcmonstrativdy about these ethical and 
political martcrs. one would. we have seen. in fact only open the door to ~ophistica l 
deception. For sophists can argue for their own advantage most persuasively precisely 
by di,guising their own argumen~ ns o bjective demonstrations grounded in intui tiv~ ly 
certain fi rst principles and by thu~ concealing these argu moots' real ground in the 
speaker's Mws. his or her life "choice" of self-aggrandizement. and in his or her 
disingentwl•~ manipulation of th~ affects. 
!d. at 217. 
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that takes place on a heart-to-heart, visceral level that grips the 
Jjstener in a psychosomatic manner.12U 
In many ways, legal practice exempl ifies the nearly complete 
subordination of original argument to the encrustation of demon-
strative reasoning. As one commentator accurately summarizes, "the 
particular rhetoric that law embraces is the rhetoric of foundations 
and logical deductions ... [and) is one tha't relies, above all else, upon 
the denial that it is rhetoric that is being done. "tZt Similarly, Smith 
concludes that "judicial reasoning . .. has effectively displaced and 
buried the original ways we exist and talk with each other in availing 
ourselves of the words said from time out of mind that we have first 
heard from others. "122 The play of o riginal argument. in the 
communicative praxis of two persons taking counsel with each other, 
lies hidden behind the assertive mode of demonstrative argument that 
appears to define the work of lawyers and judges. The rhetorical and 
affective d imensions of legal argumentatio n are wholl y repressed. 
It may not be immediately clear how an examination of 
communicative praxis and o riginal argument help to clarify the 
problem of ideology critique. Smith emphasizes that there are 
"important, challenging consequences'' if we acknowledge that the 
demonstrative argumen tation exemplified in legal practice is 
predicated on a form of reasoning that "originates in our belonging 
together ... in a community of reasoners."123 However, Smith does 
not expressly describe the consequences of his radical challenge to 
demonstrative reasoning, nor does he claim to achieve anything other 
than providing a more accurate description of reasoning by 
recuperating the hermeneutics of original argument.124 My claim is 
that Smith and Schrag arc important windows not only to the 
IZ<l Set id. at 217-90 (chapter ti, entitled "Emhod ieJ A rgu ment as Pa thollogica l: The 
Original Fusion of Pt~thos and Logos"). Smith persuasivdy n::jects Derrida's claim that text~ 
have prionty vwr ora l comrnunication~ in uncoveri ng he rmeneutical experience. See id. at134· 
56. 
121. Gerald B. Wetlaufer. Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Di.mJUrse. 76 VA. L. RE.v. I S45. 
1555 (1990). 
122. Smith. supro note 114, at 749. 
123. /d. at 74/l. 
124. Smith ends his book "'ith nn acknowledgment that he has made the case for a 
hermeneutica l retrieva l of the aural dimensions of original argument only by means of a written 
te.xt that employs dcrno nstranve argwncntation. S\1!TH,.sttpra note LJ3, a t ~10. As a n:sull , his 
demonstration of th.: "true" character of our being-with-oth~: r, tronically lend'> to unde rmine his 
thesis. Perhaps Lt is this irony that ke.:ps Smith from pre~ing the conclusion~ of hi~ research, 
since ~uch an dfort wvuld particularly thn:aten to dc:volv.: into demon~trattve argument. In 
what fv llows I hope to "demonstrate " that the c ritic milllt ;,bandon lht: demonstrative 
argumculalttm of 11 strong conception of cr itical thc:ory . . My strategy i> to emb race the irony. 
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experience of understanding-what Balkin prosaically terms an 
"economy of exchange"-but also to the critical agency that is 
enabled by this experience. 
Balkin mistakenly limits the experience of understanding by 
investing the self-as-critic with the duty to manage the hermeneutical 
experience of understanding through careful selection of the 
influences that she will suffer. To avoid the ego-centric conclusions 
that follow from his narrow reading of hermeneutical experience, 
Balkin then embraces a transcendental argument that attempts to 
explain the subject's never-ceasing embrace of new experience as a 
result of the lack of complete self-possession. Balkin's project, 
although quite promising in its descriptive stages. ultimately does 
violence to his own presuppositions in order to provide an account of 
ideology critique. In contrast Schrag and Smith begin with 
Gadamer's more sa tisfactory account of human understanding, and 
then develop this account in ways that open the space for a 
hermeneutical account of critical legal theory. 
Schrag connects the inherent responsiveness of the "postmodern 
self" reconceived as a performance within communal practices - to 
the critical agency that results from a transversal rationality that lies 
across historically conditioned discourses. Smith links the post-
modern self to the hermeneutics of original argument. in which 
another person is "heard" in a way that changes the listener as 
opposed to changing only the listener's mind.m Smith provides a 
historical account of the ambivalence in Plato and Aristotle as they 
covered over the Homeric tradition and set the course for modern 
"rationality," but once his persuasive recovery of original argument is 
complete there is an additional and crucial point to be drawn. The 
critical agency of the postmodern self is found in the experience of 
original argument, in which one's insularity is disrupted and 
continually reconfigured. 
In his exchange with Habermas, Gadamer steadfastly refused to 
surrender to the theoretical urge to demarcate a critical rationality 
that looked behind hermeneutic experience. But Gadamer's 
125. Smith explains: 
Thus, what ~omeone undergOCl> in embodied argument and rhetoric IS much more than 
a change of mimi from di.'>~~: nt to a~•ent. from ··I don't sec it lhat way" to "I \lo.- On 
the contrary. it is a change of h~arr, a change in how one .f~tels about Htm~thing. whi.:h 
is to say, a •·gut" change ~UillClimcs even from r<::belliou~ rclu.oal to const!nt. from 
"Over my dead body!" to •·Ye~. I will." This response is not just iotc llcctual. On lhc 
contrary. such bearing iH in a fundamental sense visceral. 
/d. ar 220. 
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onto.logical stance does not discount the lesson that I draw from my 
reading of Schrag and Smith: critical rationality inheres within 
hermeneutic experience. Hermeneutic experience is never passive 
reception, nor is it orchestrated by an individual wbo method-
ologically directs her own understanding. Hermeneutic experience 
involves friction; it is no t a dance that glides effortlessly. Rather than 
a choreographed scene with Fred Astair and Ginger Rogers, 
hermeneutic experience is more akin to the collective experience, or 
fusion of horizons, in a mosh pit. Against the deep and rich 
background of communal understandings and practices, two persons 
in consultation with each other experience a disruption and challenge_ 
If hermeneutic experience did not generate critical distance, it is 
difficult to understand how we could even perceive another person as 
"other." In front of the "other" person (or text, or practice), we 
continually are brought up short and thrown into a transversal 
rationality that operates without secure foundations that can be 
elaborated solely by logical implications. Transversal rationality is 
Lhe activity of operating between and across localized discourses and 
practices, and therefore involves some measure of critical distance 
from particular contexts. The important point is that this critical 
distance, this friction, this intermingling of consensus and dissensus, is 
alwnys a product of hermeneutic experience. 
An example might clarify this point. The intense partnership of a 
successful marital or life-partner relationship provides a model of the 
operation of human understanding. Within such a relationship two 
persons undoubtedly experience a fusion of horizons, and together 
they develop a shared background through time that subtends present 
experience as an abiding "agreement." But Gadamer's analysis does 
not capture the full depth of such a relationship if it ends with a rosy. 
Hollywood picture of a complete and timeless fusion of horizons. In 
my experience, parties to an intense, lifelong relationship find that 
their individuality is heightened when they are with their partner. 
Communicative praxis does not flatten individuality into an 
undifferentiated shared existence; instead, a deeply relational 
existence provides a sense that one·s "self" is uniquely realized 
precisely because one is so deeply entwined with another. T his reality 
is the lifeblood of classic situation comedies, in which spousal 
relationships exhibit a constitutive ··oneness·· even as each person is 
revealed as (a humorously idiosyncratic) individual. As an exemplar 
of hermeneutical experience, life-partner re.lationships demonstrate 
that a hermeneutical experience resulting in a fusion of horizons 
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imports within it a critical distance that provides perspective on 
oneself and the world. J expect that most people regard their life-
partner relationship as beneficial for this very reaso n: it is the means 
by which they become the best person possible just because they gain 
perspective on themselves (and the world) by virtue of their 
relationship with another. It is only when interacting with a 
superficial and casual acquaintance that the ''everydayness" of the 
experience tends to leave no imprint on oneself, for it is the lack of a 
full-bodied hermeneutical experience that leaves one's sense of self (a 
prej udiced forestructu re) unchallenged. 
Having recovered t.he critical dimension of hermeneutical 
experience, it is now abundantly clear that Balkin's "transcendental 
move" is not just unnecessary to account for cri tique, it is also 
misleading. To this point, the discussion has fo<:used on herme-
neutical experience. or what Gadamer would Lerm the phenom-
enology of human understanding. The problems with Balkin's 
transcendental account arc made even clearer by shifting attention 
from describing the dynamics of understanding to providing an 
account of critical theory. Balkin expressly acknowledges the 
reflexive character of critical theory, but his transcendental turn 
empties his recognition of any radical significance. Balkin 's critic, as 
an analyst wary of being hermeneutically co-opted, is driven by an 
'' inexhaustiole urge" to define justice; she docs not find her 
motivation within hermeneutical encounters. Indeed, it is her urge 
toward justice that keeps her from wholly surrendering herself to 
hermeneutical encounters. By positing a transcendental source of the 
critic's motivation, Balkin effectively exempts the critic from analysis 
by leaving it to the critic, now invested with the qualities of a 
relatively robust subjectivity, to monitor her hermeneutical 
experience. 
Beginning with a Gadamerian account of understanding, and 
adopting the elaborations proposed by Schrag and Smith, J propose a 
new account of ideology critique. Balkin's characterization of 
ideology is correct: ideology is not the result of defective modes of 
understanding, it is a normative assessment of the unacceptable 
results flowing from certain understandings. Philosophical herme-
neutics suggests a very different role for the critical theor;st, however, 
and in doing so provides an alternative to Balkin's unsatisfactory 
transcendental turn. Because critique is a .feature of hermeneutical 
experience, it is appropriate to view the critic of ideology as one who 
can foster this experience and overcome the superficiality that defines 
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too many encounters in contemporary life. Critical theory, under this 
view, is the facilitation of a suppressed feature of hermeneutical 
experience. The critic does not employ a special methodology that 
stands outside ordinary hermeneutical encounters. Instead, the critic 
adopts a distinct posture within hermeneutical encounters that 
maximizes the critical element already present in these encounters. 
In a recent article, I have explained this approach in greater 
detail by using the practice of postmodern psychotherapi sts as a 
model for critical legal theory.''-" Postmodem psychotherapy provides 
a model for critical legal theorists because it is a theoretically 
informed hermeneutical activity; the therapist adopts a theoretical 
posture. to assist her client, but she does not pretend to stand outside 
her hermeneutical engagement with the client in dialogue. 
Postmodern psychotherapists disavow the traditional conception of 
psychoanalysis as a comprehensive theory that permits the "expert" 
analyst to "see through" the patient's neuroses. Instead, they adopt a 
philosophical position of "not-knowing." Postmodern psycho-
therapists locate the critical dimension of therapy in a collaborative 
dialogue with the client rather than claiming the authority to artfully 
direct the client's review of Jife options from the therapist's presumed 
position of superiority. Under their account. the therapist is an 
expert in facilitating the patient's attempts to fashion a satisfactory 
life narrative, rather than an expert in diagnosing what is wrong with 
the patient according to a theoretically derived template. 
Postmodern psychotherapists regard therapeutic dialogue as a 
hermeneutical, rhetorical, and narrative experience that exploits the 
critical element of all dialogue. Changing the focus from uncovering 
psychic reality by means of a theory to engaging a client in a 
productive dialogue, postmodero therapists characterize their 
practice as helping the client to interpret her situation and then 
deliberating with the client about the possibilities for change. As 
interpretation and persuasion, postmodern psychotherapy is not just a 
collection of techniques wielded by an expert for the purpose of 
"creating" mental health. Psychotherapeutic dialogue explores the 
client's situation and illuminates the resources available for 
overcoming perceived inadequacies, working from an understanding 
that life is narratively structured. The therapist enters into dialogue 
126. Francis J. Mootz Ill , Psyc.horhaapeutic Pracrice As a Mud.d for Pnsrmndem Legal 
Theory. 12 YALE J.L. & HUMI\N. 21N (2000). My description of this mO<.Iel in the text tbat 
follows is an overview of the dcuti lcd argument that I present in rhe above article. to which 1 
refer the reader who seeks elabOration and citations to the literature. 
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with the client to hear a troubled narrative and to lend her assistance 
to the client's efforts to revise the narrative. Because the client's 
prenarrative experience permits a range of narrative constructjons 
rather than just a single accurate representation, therapy is always a 
contextualized and pragmatic assessment in which the therapist acts 
as a facilitator of the client's narrative revisions. 
Postmodern therapists employ critical theory in a unique 
manner. Their goal is not to establish a template of menta] health 
that they can place over client narratives; rather, they theorize about 
how to foster a genuine dialogue with their clients, because critical 
insight is only gained within such a dialogue. Clients require 
assistance in recognizing that their life narratives have become unduly 
rigid, usually because they have inappropriately extrapolated one 
mode of responding to particular situations (e.g., anger) to a more 
generalized mode of being (e.g., depression). The therapist's goal is 
to establish equilibrium in the client's life by fostering a dialogue in 
which the client experiences the false sense of necessity and rigidity 
that defines the client's life. Psychotherapy is a process in which the 
therapist and client together uncover options in the client's life by 
exposing the contingent and multivalent character of socially 
constructed narratives that the client had formerly regarded as 
inflexible and given. The important point is that postmodern 
psychotherapeutic practice is oriented toward facilitating this 
dialogue rather than charting the "correct" narrative that will "cure" 
the patient. 
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy embraces the critical 
theory of "not-knowing" that postmodern psychotherapists espouse. 
ln The Enigma of llealth,127 Gadamer argues that the practice of 
psychotherapy exemplifies the hermeneutical nature of medical 
practice. Although psychotherapeutic dialogue often is disparaged as 
a set of verbal techniques that cannot match the efficacy of 
psychopharmacological cures, Gadamer contends that this specialized 
form of discourse in fact embodies the inescapable hermeneutical 
nature of the healing arts.•:!!' Gadamer famously argued against 
Habennas's psychoanalytic model of critical social theory,129 but he 
acknowledges that psychotherapeutic dialogue, as understood by 
127. HASS-GEORG GADt\MER: THE ENlCiMA OF HEALTH: THE ART OF HEAUNG IN A 
SCIENTIFIC' AGE (Jaso.n Gaig,l.\r & Nicholas Walker tlifms .. Sranford Univ. Press 1996) (1993). 
I 2K. See id. at 77. 
129. For my review of the Gadnmer-Habermas debate, ,.,e Mootz. supra note l26. ar 306-4 !; 
Mootz. Ontological Basi.~. supra note 26, at 568-%. 
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many postmodern psychotherapists, provides a model of the critical 
element of hermeneutical expericnce.130 This distinction is best 
explained by concluding that Gadamer criticizes the Freudian 
conception of psychoanalysis as a theoretically guided method of 
revealing the patient's true psychological state, but that he 
acknowledges the significance of psychotherapeutic dialogue carried 
out within a hermeneutic engagement. however fragile and tentative, 
between therapist and patient. 
Schrag and Smith expand Gadamer's philosophy in a way that 
connects with this psychotherapeutic model of critical theory. The 
ability of transversal rationality to open the space for critique is 
precisely what is impaired in the person who seeks psychotherapy, 
and so it is possible to construe the practice of psychotherapy as a 
practical reconstruction of transversal rationality by overcoming 
narrative rigidity. Moreover, postmodern psychotherapy exemplifies 
the hermeneutics of original argument in practice, since the therapist 
"hears" the client's narrative and then deliberates with the client 
rather than attempting to "demonstrate'' the path to a "cure." When 
postmodern psychotherapists theorize about their practice, then , they 
are modeling what it means to do critical theory if one accepts 
Gadamer·s ontology of human understanding. 
My psychotherapeutic model of critical theory stands in sharp 
contrast to Balkin's subject-centered critical approach. Although 
purporting to disavow traditional conceptions of critique, Balkin 
repeatedly describes the critic as an "analyst" who engages in 
dialogue wilh an '·analysand" in order to expose the analysand's 
ideological effects. Wary of the obvious implications of using such 
scientistic language, Balkin emphasizes that ideological analysis is 
akin to a ''narrative reconstruction" in which the analyst acknowl-
edges that she does not have access to a unitary "correct" narrative 
for the analysand. and she characterizes her work with the analysand 
as fashioning a new narrative within a plural universe.U1 Balkin keeps 
the critic in the driver's seat, though, even if he recognizes that there 
are multiple routes to arriving at the goal of securing autonomy for 
the analysand. The critic stands apart from the patient, and it is only 
by virtue of doing so that she generates a critical perspective on the 
patient's condition. 
The psychotherapeutic model of critical legal theory yields 
lJO. St><! O AOAMER. s11prn note 127. at 163-73. 
131. St'e 8ALKiN.supra not.: 2. at 201-H:I. 
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important insights into the nature of critique. If a legal theorist is 
persuaded that the philosophical stance of ··not-knowing" will 
facilitate her critical practice to the greatest degree possible. what 
further guidance does the psychotherapeutic model provide for her 
critical activity? I believe that the model redefmes the theorist's 
project in terms of two general, and related, goals: first, the critical 
theorist should disrupt rigid narrative constructions that are proving 
problematic to the client; second, the critical theorist should expose 
how particular responses have been unsatisfactorily abstracted from 
discrete situations into a more generalized mode of being. In the 
psychotherapeutic context these goals are pursued by carefully 
attending to the client's story and engaging in dialogue oriented 
toward expanding the client's (and the therapist's) narratively 
structured mode of existence. By adopting this practice as a model of 
critical legal theory, I propose to extend these defining features to the 
different context of legal critique. 
Modeling critical legal theory on these features of 
psychothe::rapeutic practice appears problematic because there is no 
presenting client seeking the assistance of the therapist. But this 
difference underscores the very poirtl of applying the model: critical 
legal theorists must regard the legal tradition as a ''presenting client." 
The legal tradition speaks no less than an individual client; the legal 
tradition is nothing more than the accumulated voices of individuals 
that have been rendered into texts that have a history of continuing 
effects. A psychotherapeutic model of critical legal theory rejects the 
idea that "law" is a concept awaiting explication in favor of the view 
that law is a narratively structured social process. The participants in 
legal practice present their anxieties no less than an individual 
entering psychotherapy. The model counsels the critical legal theodst 
to attend to the "presenting·· rather than forcing a theoretically 
derived template over the legal tradition. The critical legal theorist 
must take lawyers and judges struggling with practical problems 
seriously, rather than regarding them as self-deluding simpletons who 
must be diagnosed rather than dialogically engaged. 
The critical legal theorist can disrupt unproductive abstractions 
and the sense of false necessity within legal discourse only by means 
of a hermeneutical-rhetorical engagement that seeks to recover a 
broader, narratively structured sense of unity from within a situation 
of apparent contraries that are manifested iJ1 the practice. The 
theorist has no recourse to, nor any need for , an external standard of 
critique against which practices can be assessed, because the critical 
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project involves an identification and opening of possibilities within 
the narratively structured soda! realm of law. In other words, the 
goal of critical legal theory is not to develop an ideal legal narrative 
and then to import it into practice, but rather to demonstrate the 
malleability of narrative reality to participants in the practice in order 
to promote the possibility of overcoming unhelpful. static conven tions 
and to open the possibility for more satisfactory participation in the 
ongoing process of creating and transforming legal meaning. The 
psychotherapeutic model counsels the critical legal theorist to engage 
in this dialogue like a postmodern psychotherapist: not by attempting 
to preserve a distinct and superior theoretical knowledge of the client, 
and yet also not like a friend (or adversary) wholly engaged in 
ordinary conversation (or legal argumentation). The theoretical 
posture of "not-knowing''n2 describes the goal of a critical theorist 
working within a hermeneutical experience to maximize critical 
insight. 
The psychotherapeutic model is not just a technique, but rather 
speaks to the personal quaUtics of the critic. The critical legal theorist 
must undertake a critical project with the curiosity and flexibility that 
will permit the tradition to speak more fully, since a theoretically 
informed methodology for reconceptualizing the tradition will only 
further contribute to the narrow rigidity that is the principal target of 
critique. Critical legal theorists must be ready to suspend premature 
judgment in favor of a cooperative effort to define reasonable 
resolutions, must refuse to hide behind theoretical abstraction and 
engage in the plural universe that they seek to reveal, and must 
accept responsibility for the fact that their activity is more ethical than 
it is cognitive. This approach to the critique of ideology remains 
fai thful to Gadamer's description of human understanding, but it is 
not a comforting assurance that "critique just happens.'' My psycho-
therapeutic model of critical theory poses a substantial challenge for 
critical legal theorists who are far more disposed to adopt an "all-
knowing'' theoretical posture, sinc.e it demands that they put 
themselves at risk in hermeneutic experience. Gadamer emphasizes 
this challenge by claiming that 
hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an absolute 
position but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no higher 
principle than holding oneself open in a conversation. But this 
means: Always recognize in advance the possible correctness, even 
the superiority of the conversation partner 's position. Is this too 
132. Sre Mootz, supra note 126. ul 366-72. 
20(Xl) '!'HE QUEST TO REI'ROGUAM CULTURA/..50FIWARE 
little? Indeed, this seems to me to be the kind of integrity one can 
demand only of a professor of philosophy. And one should 
demand as much.m 
91!9 
Critical legal theorists must abandon the easy route of pursuing a 
strong conception of theory and must embrace the risky play of 
transversal rationality in original argument. 
Critical theory is not an expression of a deep-seated personal 
urge toward justice that emerges from "the wellsprings of the human 
soul,"134 as Balkin would have it. Rather, critical theory is the practice 
of ma:cimizing the critical distance that occurs only within 
hermeneutical engagemen ts. Critique is always a social experience, 
and critical theory is just a reflection on facilitating this social 
experience. Following the model of postmodern psychotherapists, 
critical legal theorists are best counseled to abandon the effort to 
demonstrate the answers to social problems and to attend much more 
to hearing the questions posed within the tradition and then 
deliberating about these questions with others. 
CONCLUSION 
Balkin defines the problem of critical theory in the postmodern 
age with great skill, but his transcendental response reflects a failure 
of nerve. Philosophical hermeneutics provides an acco unt of the 
ontology of human understanding that leaves sufficie nt room for the 
experience of critique and the project of critical theory. By rereading 
Gadamer in response to the problems posed by Balkin's work we can 
uncover the subtle connections between understanding and critique, 
belonging and distanciation. Critical theory and interpretation 
emerge not as contestants in an age-old battle; rather, Lhey emerge as 
fealures of what Gadamer broadly terms our hermeneutic situation. 
Philosophical hermeneutics opens a pathway for refusing to take the 
transcendental turn in the face of the postmodern challenge but 
without surrendering the aspirations of emancipatory critique writh 
nihilistic resignation . Whether critics will be able to meet the ethical. 
cognitive, and affective demands of putting themselves at risk in a 
manner designed to maximize the cri tical dimension of hermeneutic 
experience is. of course, the real question. 
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